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COERCED CHOICE: SCHOOL VOUCHERS AND STUDENTS 
WITH DISABILITIES 
Claire Raj* 
ABSTRACT 
The landscape of public education, once thought to be a core function of the 
state, is shifting towards privatization. The appointment of Betsy DeVos as U.S. 
Secretary of Education further cements this shift. In particular, DeVos intends 
to vastly expand the availability of vouchers and tax credits that use public 
dollars to fund private school tuition. The debate over this expansion and its 
impact on traditional public schools has been polarizing and combative. Thus 
far, commentators have framed vouchers as purely matters of choice and 
increased educational opportunities. Drowned out in the debate are the voices 
of students with disabilities. This Article reframes this conversation and reveals 
that many students with disabilities may not have a choice at all.  
This Article is the first to argue that voucher legislation, as applied to 
students with disabilities, violates two principles of constitutional law: the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine and equal protection. First, some states 
force students with disabilities to give up crucial federal and state educational 
rights in exchange for vouchers. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine, 
however, limits government’s authority to require individuals to forgo their 
rights in exchange for a gratuitous benefit. Vouchers cross those limits, coercing 
students into accepting a restriction of significant rights to escape failing public 
schools. Second, equal protection requires that states sufficiently justify 
legislation that targets particular groups for disadvantage. While states claim 
that vouchers for students with disabilities are justified by better educational 
outcomes, many states are, in fact, motivated by their desire to eliminate the 
costs and burdens associated with educating students with disabilities in public 
schools. Moreover, far from providing a benefit, vouchers have the potential to 
resegregate students with disabilities—an ironic outcome given that federal 
disability rights law was founded on the principle of inclusion for all children.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The landscape of public education, once thought to be a core function of the 
state, has been shifting towards privatization over the past decade. The 2016 
election of Donald Trump and subsequent appointment of Betsy DeVos as U.S. 
Secretary of Education further cemented this shift. In her first official policy 
address, Secretary DeVos called for an expansion of school choice programs, 
stating that “we must shift the paradigm to think about education funding as 
investments made in individual children, not in institutions or buildings.”1 In 
particular, DeVos wants to vastly expand the availability of vouchers and tax 
credits that use public dollars to fund private school tuition.2 Though vouchers 
have existed for decades, they have always operated at the periphery of 
education reform efforts.3 Over the past five years, however, states have 
significantly expanded voucher or voucher-type programs.4 DeVos’s mission 
has been to supercharge these programs, taking them from the sidelines directly 
to center field. 
This shift is understandably generating contentious debates. Voucher 
proponents believe market forces and increased parental choice will improve 
educational options and outcomes.5 Voucher opponents fear that such programs 
will drain public schools of vital federal and state dollars and only further 
exacerbate the education gap between the “haves” and “have-nots.”6 Drowned 
 
 1 Erica L. Green, Betsy DeVos Calls for More School Choice, Saying Money Isn’t the Answer, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/us/politics/betsy-devos-education-school-choice-
voucher.html.  
 2 Id. Voucher programs essentially provide parents with state-funded coupons that they apply to reduce 
tuition at private schools. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, SCHOOL CHOICE SERIES: CHOICE & VOUCHERS – 
IMPLICATIONS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 1, 27 (2018). Tax credit programs provide tax incentives for 
approved educational expense, including private school tuition. Id. 
 3 Jim Ryan, School Choice and the Suburbs, 14 J.L. & POL. 459, 459–60 (1998) (describing the 
theoretical and social history of school voucher programs). The school choice movement is usually attributed to 
a 1955 essay by Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in which he advocates the government 
provide parents with vouchers that they can apply to certain eligible private schools. Who We Are: Our Legacy, 
EDCHOICE, https://www.edchoice.org/who-we-are/our-legacy/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2019). 
 4 Forty states considered private school choice legislation in the 2014–2015 legislative year. THE 
COUNCIL OF PARENT ATT’YS & ADVOCATES (COPAA), SCHOOL VOUCHERS AND STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES: 
EXAMINING IMPACT IN THE NAME OF CHOICE 1 (2016) [hereinafter COPAA REPORT].  
 5 JEFF SPALDING, THE SCHOOL VOUCHER AUDIT: DO PUBLICLY FUNDED PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE 
PROGRAMS SAVE MONEY? 1–2, 39 (2014). 
 6 Memorandum from Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) and Senate Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions 
Minority Staff to Senate Colleagues (Mar. 22, 2017) (entitled Real Choice vs. False Choice: The Repercussions 
of Privatization Programs for Students, Parents, and Public Schools) (arguing against school choice because it 
“ignores the needs of students in rural areas without private school options, ignores the threats posed to students 
with disabilities and students who may face discrimination, and ignores the parents who believe in their 
communities and want their children to be able to attend strong public schools in their neighborhood”). 
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out in the factious debates are the voices of students with disabilities. Yet, 
vouchers have both significant and unique implications for these students. 
In many instances, voucher programs attempt to roll back crucial legal 
protections for students with disabilities and do so without making parents fully 
aware of the far-reaching consequences.7 First, several states demand that 
students with disabilities waive important federal and state educational rights to 
gain access to a voucher.8 A recent federal report highlights the shocking levels 
of misinformation about the loss of these rights.9 Eighty-three percent of voucher 
programs are either vague or silent about the resulting loss of educational rights 
triggered upon acceptance of a voucher.10 As a result, students with disabilities 
can find themselves in a private school ill-equipped to meet their educational 
needs, but unable to engage federal disability rights laws to demand more 
appropriate supports or services.11 These students can only hope that the private 
school will voluntarily attempt to meet their educational needs. 
Second, the proliferation of vouchers has the potential to resegregate 
students with disabilities, a group who spent decades fighting for the right to be 
integrated into regular education settings.12 Prior to enacting sweeping federal 
disability rights laws, students with disabilities were either cordoned off into 
segregated educational settings or denied an education altogether.13 New state 
enacted voucher programs restrict eligibility by disability category, recreating 
the decades-old problem of sorting students with disabilities into different 
 
 7 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-94, PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE: FEDERAL 
ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENSURE PARENTS ARE NOTIFIED ABOUT CHANGES IN RIGHTS FOR STUDENTS WITH 
DISABILITIES 1 (2017) (discussing the lack of information provided on protections available under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act to children in private schools). 
 8 Id. at 7–8, 24–26; see COPAA REPORT, supra note 4, at 20–26. 
 9 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-94, PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE: FEDERAL ACTIONS 
NEEDED TO ENSURE PARENTS ARE NOTIFIED ABOUT CHANGES IN RIGHTS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 2 
(2017). 
 10 Id. 
 11 See infra Section II.A. 
 12 See, e.g., Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of the D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding the District 
of Columbia’s exclusion of children with disabilities from access to public education violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 302–
03 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (approving consent decree that enjoined Pennsylvania from denying education to students 
who were “mentally retarded”). 
 13 See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309 (1988) (“When the law was passed in 1975, Congress had before 
it ample evidence that such legislative assurances were sorely needed: . . . congressional studies revealed that 
better than half of the Nation’s 8 million disabled children were not receiving appropriate educational services. 
Indeed, one out of every eight of these children was excluded from the public school system altogether, many 
others were simply ‘warehoused’ in special classes or were neglectfully shepherded through the system until 
they were old enough to drop out.”) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, pt. 2 (1975)). 
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schools.14 Even with more general voucher programs, the threat of segregation 
remains because private schools are free to reject those students who need 
something more than “minor adjustments” to access the school’s program.15 
Thus, when private schools reject these students, the effect is to leave those 
particular students with disabilities in public schools. Were these students in 
well-functioning public schools, the inability to leave this setting would be a 
nonissue. But too often, not only are certain categories of students left behind, 
they are left behind in failing public schools from which their peers are rapidly 
fleeing.16 
Thus far, commentators have framed vouchers as purely matters of choice 
and increased educational opportunities.17 This Article reframes this debate to 
demonstrate that many students with disabilities may not have a choice at all. To 
the contrary, many students with disabilities will find their choices are limited 
by a lack of private schools willing to admit them. Even when they are admitted, 
private schools may not be able to properly serve their needs, or worse, may 
segregate them into separate learning environments. Thus, rather than expanding 
opportunities, states take advantage of students with disabilities’ compromised 
situations and force them to give up their legal rights in exchange for vouchers 
to attend schools that may be just as ill-equipped to meet their needs. 
This Article analyzes the serious constitutional and statutory issues that the 
current generation of vouchers raises for students with disabilities. It is the first 
to apply two constitutional doctrines—unconstitutional conditions and equal 
protection—to expose the illegality of such legislation. 
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine stands for the proposition that the 
government should not indirectly entice or coerce citizens to give up 
constitutional rights when direct encumbrance of those rights would be 
 
 14 For example, Ohio’s Autism Scholarship Program limits eligibility to students diagnosed with Autism 
who have a current Individualized Education Plan (IEP). OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3310.41 (West Supp. 2019); 
see also NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SCHOOL VOUCHER LAWS: STATE-BY-STATE COMPARISON 
(2014), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/educ/StateByStateVoucherComparison.pdf. 
 15 34 C.F.R. § 104.39 (2018). 
 16 See infra Section II.B. 
 17 See, e.g., Wendy F. Hensel, Recent Developments in Voucher Programs for Students with Disabilities, 
59 LOY. L. REV. 323, 324 (2013) (exploring developments in school choice for students with disabilities); Wendy 
F. Hensel, Vouchers for Students with Disabilities: The Future of Special Education?, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 293 
(2010) (discussing the impact of vouchers on students with disabilities); Brad J. Davidson, Comment, Balancing 
Parental Choice, State Interest, and the Establishment Clause: Constitutional Guidelines for States’ School-
Choice Legislation, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 435, 440 (2002) (discussing school choice in the context of the 
Establishment Clause). 
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prohibited.18 The doctrine arises when the government offers a gratuitous 
benefit, but conditions the benefit on the waiver of a constitutional right.19 
Voucher legislation does exactly that. It conditions access to vouchers for 
students with disabilities on the waiver of state constitutional and federal and 
state statutory rights. In doing so, states indirectly achieve ends that would 
otherwise be illegal. 
State constitutions, with virtual uniformity, require state governments to 
provide each child with an equal or adequate education.20 Federal statutes protect 
against disability-based discrimination, ensure the supports and services 
necessary for meaningful participation in school, and guarantee a substantive 
right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE).21 These statutes, and their 
state analogs, effectively ensure equal access to the education that states are 
constitutionally obligated to provide. Requiring students to waive these rights 
thus requires them to waive crucial elements of their state constitutional right to 
an education.  
More specifically, when students with disabilities accept vouchers, they lose 
protections under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),22 the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)23 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 (Section 504).24 Title II of the ADA and Section 504 do not apply 
at all in private schools.25 The IDEA, a legal juggernaut in public schools, has 
extraordinarily limited application in private schools.26 This loss of rights, 
moreover, is not accidental. Many voucher programs explicitly require parents 
to waive access to all federal statutory disability rights and state constitutional 
rights.27 Other states surely recognize the limitation of rights in private settings, 
 
 18 Edward J. Fuhr, The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions and the First Amendment, 39 CASE 
WESTERN RESERVE L. REV. 97, 97-98 (1989). 
 19 Id.; see infra Section III.A. 
 20 EMILY PARKER, 50-STATE REVIEW: CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION (2016), 
https://www.ecs.org/wp-content/uploads/2016-Constitutional-obligations-for-public-education-1.pdf. 
 21 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 (2018). 
 22 20 U.S.C. § 1400. 
 23 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2, 104 Stat. 328 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101 (2012)). 
 24 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 
(2012)). 
 25 See 34 C.F.R. § 104.39; infra Section I.B.2. 
 26 See infra Section I.B.1. 
 27 See COPAA REPORT, supra note 4, at 3, 62–63 (Oklahoma, Florida’s McKay Scholarship, and Georgia 
ask parents to revoke all IDEA); see also NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 2, at 59 (“In the majority 
of school voucher programs, when students use vouchers to attend a private school, they relinquish their rights 
under IDEA, including the right to an IEP, FAPE, and procedural protections.”); infra Section II.A. 
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but do not bother to inform parents.28 Either way, when students enroll in a 
private school that fails to meet their needs, they are left with few, if any, options. 
They cannot sue the private school or the state for better services.29 Rather, they 
must simply suffer poor education or attempt to find a new school. 
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine tests the fairness of this waiver of 
rights in exchange for government benefits. The doctrine provides that 
government cannot engage in such a trade unless the state demonstrates that its 
interests in conditioning students’ rights outweigh the coercive nature of the 
bargain.30 State interests animating voucher legislation fail to justify this 
encroachment on rights. The fiscal savings and improved educational outcomes 
promised by states have not materialized in any substantial way and, in any 
event, pale in comparison to the serious infringement of educational rights. 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment exposes a 
second flaw with respect to vouchers and students with disabilities. It provides 
that the government cannot deny its citizens equal protection of its laws.31 Thus, 
when the government seeks to enact laws that draw distinctions among people, 
the government must justify its classifications with a sufficient purpose.32 In the 
context of vouchers, legislators have not advanced a sufficient purpose to treat 
students with disabilities different from all others. To the contrary, some appear 
to have acted with prohibited purposes. 
While disability classifications only trigger rational basis review—a 
decidedly low bar—voucher legislation fails to clear it. The Supreme Court has 
held that even under rational basis the state cannot unfairly target a group of 
individuals for disfavored treatment.33 Vouchers do just that. They strip students 
with disabilities of their federal and state guarantees of equal educational 
opportunity. They do so to rid the public education system of students whom the 
state perceives as costly and administratively burdensome.34 They send these 
 
 28 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-94, PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE: FEDERAL ACTIONS 
NEEDED TO ENSURE PARENTS ARE NOTIFIED ABOUT CHANGES IN RIGHTS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 17–
20 (2017). 
 29 See infra Section II.A. 
 30 Fuhr, supra note 18, at 106–07.  
 31 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”). 
 32 See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The general rule 
is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”). 
 33 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450; Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537–38 (1973). 
 34 JOSH CUNNINGHAM, PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES (2013), 
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students to the private sector where federal antidiscrimination laws fail to protect 
them and where the state has no further responsibility for their educational 
outcomes.35 While states are generally free to draw distinctions based on 
disability, they are not free to do so when their animating purpose is to target a 
group for disfavored treatment. 
To fully explore vouchers’ impacts on students with disabilities, this Article 
proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the explosion of school choice legislation 
in recent years and lays the groundwork for what the movement from public to 
private schools means for students with disabilities. It also introduces the federal 
statutes that protect rights of students with disabilities and examines the reach 
of those statutes in private schools. Part II discusses negative policy implications 
of voucher programs for students with disabilities, including a serious 
curtailment of important statutory disability rights and the potential for 
resegregation. Part III applies two constitutional doctrines—unconstitutional 
conditions and equal protection—to theorize why voucher legislation, when 
applied to students with disabilities, is unconstitutional. Part IV offers a simple 
solution to the many problems raised by conditioning vouchers for students with 
disabilities: prohibit such conditions. States should enact voucher programs that 
give students with disabilities full access to state and federal laws enacted to 
guard against disability discrimination. 
I. THE EXPLOSION OF SCHOOL CHOICE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 
A. School Choice Gains New Momentum 
“School choice,” a term broadly describing educational options outside of 
traditional public schools, has been in existence for over sixty years.36 But a 
movement to expand school choice has recently exploded in popularity across 
the country, with forty states considering private school choice legislation in the 
2014–2015 legislative year alone.37 States have enacted, or attempted to enact, 
a variety of programs ranging from school vouchers that essentially provide 
parents with coupons they can apply to reduce private school tuition, to 
 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/educ/lb-2111.pdf (“By shifting students with disabilities out of the public school 
system, the administrative burden of tracking and reporting student progress is reduced at both the local and 
state levels.”). 
 35 See infra Section III.B.3. 
 36 See generally Martha Minow, Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and American 
Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814 (2011) (tracing the origins of the school choice movement). 
 37 COPAA REPORT, supra note 4, at 6–7; Who We Are: Our Legacy, supra note 3. 
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educational savings accounts that provide parents with public funds they can 
deposit into a government-authorized savings account for use on tuition or other 
education-related expenses.38  
Most programs restrict eligibility to low-income families or families whose 
children are zoned for failing public schools.39 A recent trend has emerged, 
however, which significantly broadens eligibility in some voucher programs by 
disposing of income eligibility caps.40 Still, other school choice programs 
restrict eligibility to only students with documented disabilities.41 Regardless of 
the target population, in large part the desire for more “school choice” is a 
reflection of the long-term failings of certain poor-performing public schools.42 
Proponents of school choice see these programs as a way to give more families 
access to higher quality private schools, but also as a way to minimize 
government involvement and oversight in education.43 Detractors see choice 
programs as a way to redirect public money to private schools, the majority of 
which are religious.44 They view choice programs as siphoning off funding from 
an already under-resourced public school system.45 
The incentives behind the recent school choice expansion are varied, and 
while the school choice movement is generally associated with conservative 
political leanings, its supporters can cross party lines. Generally, choice 
advocates align with a conservative political ideology of limited government and 
a reliance on free markets.46 As voucher programs are typically accompanied by 
few, if any, regulations and limited government oversight, they advance a 
 
 38 COPAA REPORT, supra note 4, at 6–7. 
 39 Id.  
 40 Indiana’s Choice Scholarship Program is one of the most expansive in the country in terms of 
eligibility. KATHERINE CIERNIAK ET AL., THE INDIANA CHOICE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM: LEGAL CHALLENGES, 
PROGRAM EXPANSION, AND PARTICIPATION 2 (2015); see also Ryan Ellis, Ted Cruz’s 529 Education Savings 
Amendment to Tax Reform Is a Big Win for Families, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2017, 5:43 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanellis/2017/12/04/ted-cruz-529-education-savings-amendment-to-tax-reform-
is-a-big-win-for-families/#209ec7316c45 (“The Cruz amendment expands the use of 529 dollars for two 
additional purposes—tuition for students in K-12 private and parochial schools, and costs related to 
homeschooling a child. Up to $10,000 per year per child can be distributed for these purposes.”). 
 41 NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 14. 
 42 See Kevin Carey, How School Choice Became an Explosive Issue, ATLANTIC (Jan. 24, 2012), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/01/how-school-choice-became-an-explosive-issue/251897/. 
 43 See id. 
 44 See id. 
 45 See id. 
 46 Alia Wong, Public Opinion Shifts in Favor of School Choice, THE ATLANTIC (Aug 21, 2018) 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/08/school-choice-gaining-popularity/568063/ (describing 
overall increase in support for school choice programs and highlighting Republicans’ recent embrace of school 
choice as a “key component of the party’s platform”). 
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conservative agenda of limited government.47 Vouchers support parents’ 
decisions to determine the best educational fit for their children and place much 
faith in parents’ ability to find an appropriate school for their children. As such, 
they advance the idea that free markets and competition will improve the overall 
quality of schools as schools compete for voucher dollars. Choice programs are 
also supported by parents who are fed up with poor-performing public schools 
and are purely interested in better educational opportunities for their children. 
These parents may not buy into the conservative ideals of limited government 
and free markets, but want better schools and are willing to engage with voucher 
programs to secure that possibility.48 
The choice movement has also cleaved certain previously cohesive interest 
groups into separate factions. One such group is parents of students with 
disabilities. Vouchers present a unique conundrum for this group. On the one 
hand, students with disabilities have some of the poorest educational outcomes 
of any tracked cohort.49 They consistently demonstrate weaker scores on 
standardized tests and have lower graduation rates than their nondisabled 
peers.50 However, students with disabilities also have access to additional 
federal rights through several laws that guarantee a substantive level of 
education and prohibit disability discrimination.51 Many school voucher 
programs require that students with disabilities waive these rights as a condition 
of accepting vouchers. Even when waivers are not explicitly required, the act of 
accepting a voucher and enrolling in private school greatly limits one’s 
protections under those laws. 
The following section will lay out the basic framework of these federal 
statutes and examine their implications on students with disabilities who use 
vouchers to attend private school. 
 
 47 See generally NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 14 (listing major provisions of 
voucher programs state by state). 
 48 See, e.g., Mandy McLaren, For Indiana Special-Education Students, Choice Comes at a Cost, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/for-indiana-special-education-
students-choice-comes-at-a-cost/2016/12/26/3b875480-c3bc-11e6-9a51-cd56ea1c2bb7_story.html?utm_term= 
.ce3c533aa00f. 
 49 See STEPHEN LIPSCOMB ET AL., PREPARING FOR LIFE AFTER HIGH SCHOOL: THE CHARACTERISTICS 
AND EXPERIENCES OF YOUTH IN SPECIAL EDUCATION: VOLUME 1: COMPARISONS WITH OTHER YOUTH xii 
(2017). 
 50 Id. 
 51 See infra Section I.B. 
RAJ_6.4.2019_PUBLICATION COPY 6/4/2019 11:46 AM 
2019] COERCED CHOICE 1047 
B. Federal Disability Rights Statutes in Private Schools 
The IDEA, the ADA, and Section 504 govern schools’ interactions with and 
obligations to students with disabilities.52 These federal laws, in most cases, 
provide more substantive rights than students with disabilities would otherwise 
have if limited to state law.53 Moreover, the federal laws exist to ensure that 
students’ state constitutional rights to education are not hollow. Federal 
disability rights statutes help ensure that students are provided with the special 
education, related services and accommodations they need to access the general 
education curriculum. 
1. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
In 1975, Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
(EAHCA) to “assure that all handicapped children have available to them . . . a 
free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and 
related services designed to meet their unique needs, [and] to assure that the 
rights of handicapped children . . . are protected.”54 The EAHCA, now known 
as the IDEA,55 is essentially a grant-making statute that originated under the 
Spending Clause.56 When states agree to its terms, they receive federal dollars 
to support the cost of special education services.57 
At the heart of the IDEA is the promise to provide all children with 
disabilities a “free appropriate public education” in the least restrictive 
environment, meaning in the regular education classroom with nondisabled 
peers.58 Schools provide FAPE through designing and implementing 
individualized education programs (IEPs), a blueprint of special education 
supports and related services.59 If parents disagree about the content of the IEP 
or any provision of FAPE, they have the right to present a complaint and ask 
 
 52 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (to be codified as 
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2018)); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 729 (2012); Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2, 104 Stat. 328 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)). 
 53 See PARKER, supra note 20. 
 54 Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 3(c), 89 Stat. 775 (codified 
at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (2012)). The EAHCA is technically an amendment to the 1970 Education of the 
Handicapped Act (EHA), which had provided grants for states to provide special education services. Pub. L. No. 
91-230 (1970). 
 55 20 U.S.C. § 1400. 
 56 The Tax and Spend Clause authorizes the federal government to spend money to support the “general 
Welfare.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 57 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a). 
 58 Id. § 1400(d)(1)(A). 
 59 Id. § 1414(d). 
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that an independent hearing officer review their allegations to determine whether 
or not the school has complied with the IDEA’s requirements.60 In addition, 
parents must be invited to participate in designing an IEP to address their child’s 
special education needs.61  
The Supreme Court recently confirmed that the IDEA confers a substantive 
right to an “appropriate” education, and held that to meet its substantive 
obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP “reasonably calculated 
to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s 
circumstances.”62 Parents can file a complaint whenever they feel that the school 
has failed to live up to that obligation.63 
In contrast to the IDEA, students without disabilities only have those 
educational rights granted to them through state constitutions.64 While states 
vary with respect to the robustness of their educational clauses, they typically do 
not offer students, or their parents, the same level of due process rights found in 
the IDEA.65 Rather, regular education students have rights to notice and hearing 
prior to suspension or revocation of their educational rights.66 
Importantly, the IDEA’s force is significantly restricted in private schools.67 
Thus, students with disabilities accepting vouchers for private schools lose 
access to many of the law’s core protections. The IDEA’s reach in private school 
is limited in two key ways. First, the law itself limits applicability in private 
 
 60 Id. § 1415(b)(6). 
 61 Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B). 
 62 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1001 (2017). 
 63 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) (2012). 
 64 PARKER, supra note 20. Students also have certain federal statutory rights to privacy, but they do not 
have a federal guarantee to a substantive level of education. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g. 
 65 For example, South Carolina’s education clause reads as follows: “The General Assembly shall provide 
for the maintenance and support of a system of free public schools open to all children in the State and shall 
establish, organize and support such other public institutions of learning, as may be desirable.” S.C. CONST. art. 
XI, § 3. The South Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted the clause to require the state to confer a “minimally 
adequate education.” Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999).  
 66 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (holding that a public school must conduct a hearing before 
subjecting a student to suspension). 
 67 The IDEA distinguishes between unilateral parental placement in private school and public placement 
in private schools. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)–(B). The latter keeps states responsible for the provision of 
FAPE, even when the child is in the private school setting. Id. § 1412(a)(10)(B); see also Mark C. Weber, 
Services for Private School Students Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act: Issues 
of Statutory Entitlement, Religious Liberty, and Procedural Regularity, 36 J.L. & EDUC. 163, 180 (2007). 
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schools.68 Second, private schools limit enrollment of students with 
disabilities,69 and nothing in the IDEA curtails this action.  
A number of the IDEA’s protections either apply with less force or do not 
apply at all in private schools. The state maintains its obligation, known as “child 
find,” and must allocate a portion of federal IDEA funds to identify, locate, and 
evaluate private school children who may be eligible for special education 
services.70 It has a second duty of consultation with the private school to plan 
for the delivery of special education services to children with disabilities in 
private schools.71 However, students with disabilities who attend private schools 
have no individual entitlement to special education services.72 
Parents who elect to enroll their children in private school forfeit their 
children’s individual entitlements to special education services for the right to 
“equitable” services.73 The state remains responsible for child find, individual 
evaluations, and IEP development for students with disabilities in private 
schools, but are not responsible for the substantive provision of FAPE.74 
Consequently, parents who use vouchers to enroll their children in private 
schools give up many rights under the IDEA, including the right to demand the 
least restrictive educational environment for their children,75 the right to 
collaborate with school officials on their children’s IEPs, and the right to file a 
complaint if they are unsatisfied with the amount or type of educational services 
their children receive.76 Further, parentally placed children in private schools are 
not entitled to the same services they would have received had they remained in 
 
        68    20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10). 
        69 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 2, at 34 (“The National Coalition for Public Education 
(NCPE) states that private schools accepting voucher funds do not adequately serve students with disabilities, 
often denying them admission and subjecting them to inappropriate or excessive suspensions or expulsions.”). 
 70 States’ child find obligation exists for students in both public and private schools. 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412(a)(10)(A)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.131(a)–(b) (2018). 
 71 34 C.F.R. § 300.130–.144. 
 72 “No parentally-placed private school child with a disability has an individual right to receive some or 
all of the special education and related services that the child would receive if enrolled in public school.” Id. 
§ 300.137(a). 
 73 Equitable services are determined through a consult with “private school representatives and 
representatives of parents of parentally-placed private school children with disabilities during the design and 
development of special education and related services.” Id. § 300.134. 
 74 Weber, supra note 67, at 182. 
 75 In St. Johnsbury Academy v. D.H., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to 
invalidate a private academy’s minimum mainstreaming performance requirement, ruling that private schools 
do not have responsibility for the IDEA’s least restrictive environment (LRE) mandate. 240 F.3d 163, 170 (2d 
Cir. 2001). 
 76 See, e.g., JOSE MARTIN, CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING ASSISTIVE TECHNOLOGY 38 (2017) 
(parents filed due process complaint because they were unsatisfied with speech and language services offered 
by the school).  
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public schools.77 In short, while the IDEA obligates states to identify and 
evaluate students with disabilities in private schools, it limits this obligation to 
equitable services and stops short of mandating an entitlement to special 
education services.78 
Second, the IDEA does not mandate that private schools serve eligible 
students with disabilities. Rather, private schools are free to reject those students 
who they do not have the capacity to serve.79 Public school districts, on the other 
hand, operate under a “zero-reject” rule, as set forth in the IDEA and subsequent 
case law, whereby they must accept all eligible children with disabilities 
regardless of whether they currently have the capacity to serve them.80 It is the 
school district’s responsibility to find an appropriate placement or hire the 
necessary staff to ensure a school can meet the needs of that individual child.81 
Private schools, facing no such obligation, often reject students with disabilities 
when they feel that their current curricula and staff will not be able to meet the 
child’s needs.82 Nothing in the IDEA, or in other federal antidiscrimination laws 
to be discussed in the following section, prevents private schools from engaging 
in such exclusion. 
 
 77 “Parentally-placed private school children with disabilities may receive a different amount of services 
than children with disabilities in public schools.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.138(a)(2); see also Fowler v. Unified Sch. 
Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1437 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 78 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON SERVING CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES PLACED BY THEIR PARENTS IN 
PRIVATE SCHOOLS 6 (2011). Students with disabilities parentally placed in private schools have the right to 
invoke due process only with respect to issues of identification. 34 C.F.R. § 300.131(a), (c); OFFICE OF SPECIAL 
EDUC. & REHAB. SERVS., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON SERVING CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES PLACED BY 
THEIR PARENTS IN PRIVATE SCHOOLS (2011) (stating that school districts have an obligation to provide 
parentally placed private school students with disabilities the opportunity for equitable participation in the 
services that the district has determined to make available to this population of children with disabilities in 
private schools).  
 79 The IDEA only governs the provision of special education and related services a child would receive 
if eligible under the statute. It does not, however, have any bearing on a private school’s admission policies. The 
ADA and Section 504 prevent private schools from discriminating against students in their admissions; however, 
both laws allow private schools to limit enrollment to students who can meet their “essential eligibility 
requirements.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(a)–(c). 
 80 Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 78–79 (1999) (holding that student who was 
a quadriplegic, ventilator-dependent, and needed extensive nursing services was entitled to those services under 
the IDEA); Timothy W. v. Rochester, N.H., Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 954, 972–73 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that a 
severely handicapped child was entitled to special education and related services under the EAHCA regardless 
of his ability to benefit from those services). 
 81 34 C.F.R. § 300.115(a)–(b). 
 82 ACLU Complaint at 23, ACLU v. State of Wisconsin, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_ 
document/complaint_to_doj_re_milwaukee_voucher_program_final.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2019) (claiming 
“[j]ust 1.6 percent of voucher students have a disability, compared to nearly 20% of [Milwaukee Public School] 
students”). 
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2. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
Section 504 is a federal statute which prohibits discrimination against 
persons with disabilities in any program receiving federal dollars, including 
public and some private schools.83 The statute is, however, more than just an 
antidiscrimination law. It also confers a substantive right to an “appropriate 
education”84 and demands schools educate students with disabilities in the least 
restrictive environment.85 Like the IDEA, Section 504 requires schools to enact 
procedural safeguards, including notice, the right to review records, and the right 
to demand an impartial hearing.86 Section 504 only applies to private schools if 
they receive federal funding.87 Private schools receive federal financial 
assistance through a variety of programs, including the Every Student Succeeds 
Act, which requires equitable participation of private school students and 
teachers in certain programs specific to academic achievement and teacher 
training.88 
Like the IDEA, Section 504 has vastly different applications when it comes 
to public versus private schools. Private schools have more limited obligations 
under Section 504 because they only need to accept students who meet the 
“essential eligibility requirements” established by the schools.89 Because private 
schools generally establish more selective criteria than public schools, they can 
lawfully restrict admission of students with disabilities who fail to meet their 
criteria, so long as the criteria are based on legitimate academic policies.90 
 
 83 Section 504 states, “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of 
her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012). 
 84 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a)–(b). Section 504 defines appropriate education as those educational services that 
are designed to meet the needs of students with disabilities “as adequately as the needs of [nondisabled 
students].” Id. 
 85 Id. § 104.34. 
 86 Id. § 104.36. 
 87 “Federal financial assistance means any grant, loan, contract . . . or any other arrangement by which 
the Department provides or otherwise makes available assistance in the form of: (1) Funds; (2) Services of 
Federal personnel; or (3) Real and personal property or any interest in or use of such property . . . .” Id. 
§ 104.3(h). 
 88 20 U.S.C. § 6320 (2012); CLARE MCCANN, NEW AM. EDUC. POLICY BRIEF, FEDERAL FUNDING FOR 
STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES: THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL SPECIAL EDUCATION FINANCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 16 (2014); National School Lunch Program (NSLP), U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.fns.usda.gov/nslp/ 
national-school-lunch-program-nslp (last updated Dec. 19, 2018); see also ONPE General Issues Frequently 
Asked Questions Related to Nonpublic Schools, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oii/ 
nonpublic/faqgeneral.html?src=preview#3 (last visited Mar. 26, 2019).  
 89 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(l)(4). Private schools are also free to reject those students who need something more 
than “minor adjustments” to access the school’s program. Id. § 104.39(a). 
 90 St. Johnsbury Acad. v. D.H., 240 F.3d 163, 165–66 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding private school’s refusal 
to admit student with disabilities where student did not perform at or above grade level); Wendy F. Hensel, The 
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Further, private schools have no obligation to provide students with disabilities 
an appropriate education when the schools do not already offer programs 
designed to meet those students’ needs.91 While students with disabilities may 
have access to private schools, those schools are not required to provide students 
anything outside of “minor adjustments” to help them merely access, though not 
necessarily benefit from, the curricula.92 
3. The Americans with Disabilities Act 
The ADA extends the antidiscrimination protections of Section 504 to any 
privately owned business or facility open to the public.93 The law is broken into 
four titles, with Title III being relevant to private schools.94 Title III of the ADA 
requires private schools to make reasonable accommodations to ensure that 
students with disabilities are not excluded, denied services, segregated, or 
treated differently than their nondisabled peers.95 It extends to private schools 
regardless of whether they receive federal funding; however, it specifically 
exempts religious schools from coverage.96 
While Title III of the ADA applies to private, nonreligious schools, its 
protections for students with disabilities are limited. Title III does not confer an 
individual right to an appropriate education, thus it does not require schools to 
develop IEPs for students with disabilities.97 Rather, it only asks that covered 
schools comply with more general antidiscrimination mandates imposed on all 
public accommodations to ensure accessibility.98 Further, the law allows schools 
to claim exemptions when they can demonstrate that providing the 
accommodation “would result in an undue burden.”99 Thus, similar to Section 
504, private schools are able to limit their obligations under the ADA by limiting 
 
Limits of Federal Disability Law: State Educational Voucher Programs, 44 J.L. & EDUC. 199, 209–10 (2015). 
 91 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(a)–(c); Hensel, supra note 90, at 210. 
 92 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(a)–(c). 
 93 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012). 
 94 Id. § 12181. The other titles or subchapters of the ADA are as follows: Title I—Employment, Title II—
Public Services, Title IV—Miscellaneous Provisions. Id. §§ 12101–213. 
 95 Id. § 12182(b)(2). 
 96 The religious exemption only applies to religious schools that are controlled by religious organizations, 
including places of worship. Id. § 12187; Marshall v. Sisters of Holy Family of Nazareth, 399 F. Supp. 2d 597, 
605 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
 97 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–89; MAURICE WATSON ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF INDEP. SCH., AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT AND INDEPENDENT SCHOOLS 1, 13 (2011). 
 98 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WODATCH (PRIVATE SCHOOL) (1996). 
 99 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
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admission of students with disabilities, and invoking the undue burden 
exception.100 
Title II of the ADA, which protects individuals with disabilities from 
discrimination by public entities, is generally thought to reach only public, but 
not private, schools.101 However, there is some disagreement about the reach of 
both Title II of the ADA and Section 504—with some scholars arguing that they 
do apply to the administration of voucher programs and thus, to private 
schools.102 In 2011, in ACLU v. Wisconsin, the ACLU alleged discrimination by 
Wisconsin’s Milwaukee Parental Choice Program in violation of Section 504 
and Title II of the ADA, claiming that the voucher program illegally excluded 
students with disabilities.103 The U.S. Department of Justice agreed, finding the 
state ultimately responsible for ensuring that discrimination is not present in the 
administration of the program, “regardless of whether services are delivered 
directly by a public entity or provided through a third party.”104  
However, as Professor Wendy Hensel astutely illustrates, the ACLU’s 
complaint and subsequent Department of Justice finding marked a turning point 
in the way courts and the Department of Education previously viewed the ADA 
and Section 504’s reach in private schools.105 The Department of Education had 
previously found “federal civil rights laws, including Section 504, do not 
directly apply to the private schools participating in the [voucher] program.”106 
At the heart of the matter is whether the federal government has authority to 
compel private entities to comply with federal laws when federal dollars are not 
 
 100 But see Hensel, supra note 90, at 211 (stating that the ADA prohibits private schools from imposing 
eligibility criteria that screens out students with disabilities from participation unless the criteria are necessary 
to the provision of the schools’ services) (citing DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 98, at 1–2). 
 101 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).  
 102 Title II of the ADA applies to public schools and sets forth more robust rights, such as FAPE and the 
LRE, similar to Section 504, but Title II does not apply to private entities. Id. § 12187. However, at least one 
scholar has opined that since Congress has stated that Title II of the ADA should be interpreted consistently with 
Section 504, the regulations developed under Section 504 that are applicable to private schools apply equally to 
Title II of the ADA. Id. § 12134(b); Hensel, supra note 90, at 208. 
 103 The ACLU alleged (1) the Milwaukee school district tried to deter students with disabilities from 
applying for vouchers, (2) private schools denied admission to students with disabilities who had obtained 
vouchers, and (3) private schools expelled or otherwise forced students with disabilities to leave those schools. 
ACLU Complaint, supra note 82, at 29–31. 
 104 Letter from Jonathan Fischbach, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Educ. Opportunities Section, 
to Tony Evers, State Superintendent, Wis. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction 2 (Apr. 9, 2013) (“[Wisconsin’s] obligation 
to eliminate discrimination against students with disabilities in its administration of the school choice program 
is not obviated by the fact that the schools participating in the program are private secular and religious 
schools.”). 
 105 Hensel, supra note 90, at 221–22. 
 106 Id. at 214. 
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involved. Professor Hensel compellingly argues that neither Section 504 nor 
Title II of the ADA apply to private schools through state-funded voucher 
programs.107 In her estimation, private schools are not turned into public 
institutions simply by accepting vouchers from parents.108 As such, the states’ 
obligations under the ADA and Section 504 are to ensure nondiscrimination in 
the administration of vouchers. However, once parents apply those vouchers to 
the private school of their choice, states are not obligated to ensure that private 
schools comply with federal statutes.109 Ultimately, as long as states ensure there 
is “meaningful access” to voucher programs, the states have met their obligation 
under federal laws.110 
The question of which federal laws can reach into private schools may 
become a crucial one should the federal government seek to expand its role in 
voucher programs. School choice has gained more momentum through the 
Trump Administration’s appointment of Betsy DeVos as Education Secretary, 
herself a long-time choice advocate.111 President Trump’s proposed budget for 
fiscal year 2018 included a $250 million allocation to the U.S. Department of 
Education to study the impact of private school vouchers.112 While the 
Department of Education has denied any plans to fund a federal voucher 
program, it has suggested that states applying for federal dollars to develop 
school choice programs must adhere to federal law.113 Thus, by accepting federal 
funding, states may expose themselves to federal obligations tied to that 
funding.114 The following Part will explore federal laws’ current implications 
for state-enacted voucher programs. 
 
 107 Id. at 213–16, 225. 
 108 Id. at 215. 
 109 Id.; see also Liberty Res., Inc. v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 528 F. Supp. 2d 553, 569–70 (E.D. Pa. 2007) 
(holding that the State met its obligation under the ADA by providing meaningful access to a housing voucher 
program and was not obligated to ensure that the private landlords complied with Title II of the ADA). 
 110 Alexander v. Choate set forth the meaningful access rule. The Court reasoned that the “Section 504 
seeks to assure evenhanded treatment and the opportunity for handicapped individuals to participate in and 
benefit from programs receiving federal assistance . . . [but it] does not . . . guarantee the handicapped equal 
results . . . .” Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 304 (1985). 
 111 Betsy DeVos, Secretary of Education—Biography, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/news/staff/ 
bios/devos.html?src=hp (last modified May 23, 2018). 
 112 Andrew Ujifusa, Ed. Dept. Has No Plans for a ‘Federal Voucher Program.’ Let’s Break that Down., 
EDUC. WK. BLOG (May 31, 2017, 6:20 AM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2017/05/federal_ 
voucher_program_no_plans_education_department.html. 
 113 Id. 
 114 The D.C. Choice Act is the only federally funded voucher program. COPAA REPORT, supra note 4, at 
6. 
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II. VOUCHERS’ PRACTICAL EFFECTS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 
Many parents of a child with a disability perceive vouchers as a welcome 
escape from a public school system that is failing to adequately meet the child’s 
needs.115 The willingness to accept a voucher is at times driven by both the 
public school’s failings and a hope that a private school will be able to achieve 
success.116 Some parents may be unaware of the legal rights they shed when 
accepting a voucher, but others are fully aware and knowingly accept the risks 
to escape a failing public school system for the possibility of something better.117 
This exchange of federal educational rights for the gamble that private school 
will prove better has the potential for enormous and far-reaching impacts. 
First, students with disabilities who accept vouchers will lose access to 
important federal protections designed to ensure their equal access to education. 
Most significantly, many states further limit the IDEA’s already constricted 
reach in private schools by forcing parents to waive their rights under the law as 
a condition of accepting a voucher.118 These mandated waivers serve to 
indemnify states against any failure to provide educational services despite what 
may be contained in federal and state laws.119 Second, the proliferation of 
vouchers has the potential to resegregate students with disabilities—the exact 
outcome federal law sought to eliminate forty years ago. Despite voluminous 
research demonstrating the effectiveness of inclusive educational settings,120 
voucher legislation fails to prioritize inclusion as a goal. Rather, many voucher 
programs intentionally facilitate the resegregation of students with disabilities.  
 
 115 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 2, at 40 (“Focus group participants indicated that higher 
expectations of school for students with disabilities were in fact one reason they decided to use a choice 
program.”). 
 116 Id. at 41 (Parents in one study cited a variety of reasons for accepting vouchers to leave public schools 
including, safer schools, respecting parental input, higher expectations for students with disabilities, and more 
or better special education services).  
 117 Id. at 61 (“NCD research showed that state programs and private schools often fail to notify parents of 
students with disabilities about their rights and about how those rights may be forfeited in voucher programs; 
other parents received information but still felt unprepared to make a fully informed decision. Other parents felt 
the voucher programs were worth any risks and knowingly gave up special education rights without concerns 
about it.”).  
 118 Wisconsin, Tennessee, Colorado, Ohio, and the District of Columbia allow for partial IDEA rights, 
while Oklahoma, Florida’s McKay Scholarship, and Georgia require parents to revoke all IDEA rights. Id. at 3. 
Nevada, Utah, Arkansas, and Indiana are silent about rights. Id. 
 119 For example, an Iowa state statute reads as follows: “School districts and area education agency boards 
shall make public school services, which shall include special education programs and services . . . available to 
children attending nonpublic schools in the same manner and to the same extent that they are provided to public 
school students.” IOWA CODE ANN. § 256.12(2)(a) (West 2012). 
 120 Larry G. Daniel & Debra A. King, Impact of Inclusion Education on Academic Achievement, Student 
Behavior, and Self-esteem, and Parental Attitudes, 91 J. EDUC. RES. 67 (1997); Dianne L. Ferguson et al., 
Improving Education: The Promise of Inclusive Schooling, NAT’L INST. FOR URB. SCH. DEV. 1 (2000). 
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The following section will first analyze how acceptance of a voucher triggers 
the loss of critical legal protections for students with disabilities. It will then 
explore the potential of broad-reaching voucher policies to resegregate students 
with disabilities into separate schools and classrooms. 
A. The Loss of Critical Legal Protections 
Students with disabilities who enroll in private schools must reconcile this 
decision with a significant curtailment of federal statutory rights. Students with 
disabilities who accept vouchers to facilitate this enrollment often face even 
more restrictions on those rights. The most aggressive voucher programs 
eliminate all rights under the IDEA, Section 504 and the ADA, as well as state 
constitutional rights to education.121 For example, Arkansas’s Succeed 
Scholarship Program for Students with Disabilities requires parents to “sign an 
acknowledgement that, by enrolling a child in a private school, the 
parent . . . waives the procedural safeguards granted by the IDEA.”122 Students 
who participate in Florida’s McKay Scholarship, which is limited to students 
with disabilities who currently have IEPs in public schools, must agree to opt 
out of all the IDEA’s due process rights.123  
But, even when parents are not asked to waive all their rights as a condition 
of the voucher, none of the federal laws carry the same level of protections in 
private schools as they do in public schools. Equally troubling, students often 
waive federal protections without a complete understanding of what they are 
giving up.124 And no state makes any attempt to meaningfully inform parents of 
the changes they tacitly accept when enrolling their child in a voucher program.  
The various rights parents have across Section 504, the ADA, and the IDEA 
are complex. Consequently, parents give up significant rights when electing a 
voucher for a private school. The following section has distilled the loss of rights 
into four categories: (1) a substantive guarantee of an “appropriate” education, 
 
 121 See, e.g., ARK. DEP’T OF EDUC., SUCCEED SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM (2017) (explanatory PowerPoint), 
https://arksped.k12.ar.us/documents/policyAndRegulations/SucceedScholarship/SucceedScholarshipProgramE
xplanatoryPowerPoint.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2019). 
 122 Id. 
 123 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1002.39, 1002.421 (West Supp. 2019). Although Florida requires a waiver of 
IDEA rights, this condition is not clear on the McKay Scholarship website. See McKay Scholarship, FLA. DEP’T 
EDUC., http://www.fldoe.org/schools/school-choice/k-12-scholarship-programs/mckay/ (last visited Mar. 26, 
2019). Other states explicitly include language stating that students who enroll under voucher programs will be 
treated as unilateral parental placements in private schools. See, e.g., COPAA REPORT, supra note 4. 
 124 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-94, PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE: FEDERAL ACTIONS 
NEEDED TO ENSURE PARENTS ARE NOTIFIED ABOUT CHANGES IN RIGHTS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 24–
29 (2017). 
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(2) parental participation, (3) discipline protections, and (4) school 
accountability. While all three statutes contain significant protections, the IDEA 
provides the most robust framework of educational rights.125 Consequently, the 
following section will focus on the loss of IDEA rights, and will note any 
significant differences as it relates to the rights contained in Section 504 and the 
ADA. 
1. Substantive Guarantee of an “Appropriate” Education 
First, when students with disabilities accept vouchers, they put faith in 
private schools’ promise to educate them and sign away the right to a substantive 
guarantee of FAPE.126 The Supreme Court has recently interpreted FAPE to 
confer a substantive right to an education that is “reasonably calculated to enable 
a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”127 
Public schools are tasked with crafting IEPs, highly structured blueprints of 
special education, and related supports and services designed to accord FAPE.128 
IEPs take stock of where a child is both academically and functionally, and 
describe the special education and supportive services to be provided so that the 
child can reach annual goals.129 When parents feel their school has failed to 
confer FAPE, they can invoke the IDEA’s procedural protections and file a 
complaint with an independent hearing officer.130 The hearing officer is tasked 
with reviewing parents’ complaints and deciding whether the school has met its 
obligations under the IDEA.131 Thus, students not only have a guarantee of 
education designed to help them make progress, but parents also have a way to 
enforce that guarantee.  
IEPs are not required in private schools. Rather, private schools must craft a 
“services plan” for parentally placed private school children with disabilities.132 
Services plans are far less structured than IEPs and only require a description of 
 
 125 See Perry A. Zirkel, An Updated Comprehensive Comparison of the Idea and Section 504/ADA, 342 
WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 886, 887–95 (2017) (outlining the framework of educational rights under the IDEA, 
Section 504, and the ADA). 
 126 The IDEA mandates that public schools provide students with FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) 
(2012). While the FAPE standard under the IDEA differs from that under Section 504 and Title II of the ADA, 
all three grant students with disabilities a right to appropriate education and the ability to invoke due process 
procedures should schools fail to deliver on that right. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a), 
(c)(4) (2018). 
 127 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017). 
 128 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (outlining the substantive requirements of an IEP). 
 129 See id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I). 
 130 See id. § 1415(b)(6). 
 131 See id. § 1415(f)(1)(A); Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 994. 
 132 34 C.F.R. § 300.132(b) (2018). 
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the special education and related services that will be provided to the child.133 
Most importantly, parents who accept vouchers to enroll in private schools 
waive their child’s individual right to special education under the IDEA.134 They 
do not have the right to invoke due process procedures and complain about the 
type, amount, or quality of special education services.135 
2. Parental Participation 
Second, parents who accept vouchers give up their statutory right to be 
included in educational decisions made with respect to their child.136 The IDEA 
requires that schools ensure parental participation in IEP development.137 
Parents’ concerns are central to discussions about educational supports and 
services for their children.138 The law obligates schools to seek out parental 
consent for evaluations and the provision of special education services as well 
as provide notice any time the school wishes to make a change to the IEP or 
refuses to make a change requested by the parent.139 In short, parents have a 
statutory right to a seat at the table whenever important decisions are being made 
with respect to their children’s education.140 
In contrast, parents lose these statutory guarantees of participation when they 
move their children to private schools. Of course, private schools may welcome 
parents’ input and invite them to participate in decisions surrounding their 
children’s education. But, there is no statutory guarantee of such invitations. 
Should schools and parents disagree, and should the disagreement reach an 
impasse, private schools are under no obligation to continue to engage with 
parents. They can simply make unilateral decisions and if parents are unsatisfied, 
their only recourse is to withdraw and enroll their child elsewhere. 
 
 133 See id. § 300.138. 
 134 Id. § 300.137(a) (“No parentally-placed private school child with a disability has an individual right to 
receive some or all of the special education and related services that the child would receive if enrolled in a 
public school.”). 
 135 Arguably, Section 504’s due process protections remain, but as discussed previously, Section 504’s 
reach is limited to those private schools that accept federal funding, and, even where applicable, schools can 
restrict enrollment to only those students who meet “essential eligibility requirements.” See 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.39, 
300.137, 300.140. 
 136 Id. § 300.322. 
 137 20 U.S.C. §1415(b)(1) (2012) (providing “an opportunity for the parents of a child with a disability to 
. . . participate in meetings with respect to the identification, evaluation, and placement of the child”).  
 138 See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I)–(II), 1415(b)(3) (requiring parental consent in various 
circumstances). 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id.; Blackmon ex rel. Blackmon v. Springfield R-XII Sch. Dist., 198 F.3d 648, 658 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(“Although the IDEA mandates individualized ‘appropriate’ education for disabled children, it does not require 
a school district to provide a child with the specific educational placement that her parents prefer.”). 
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The threat of withdrawal, in some cases, may be enough to incentivize 
schools to work with parents towards mutually agreeable solutions, but not in 
every case—and perhaps not in a case where the child exhibits challenging 
behaviors that prove difficult to manage. In such scenarios, parents may struggle 
to find a private school willing to provide the essential support, training, or 
resources necessary to help manage challenging student behaviors. This 
dilemma leads directly into another significant loss of rights: disciplinary 
protections. 
3. Disciplinary Protections 
When children with disabilities accept a voucher and leave the public school 
system, they forgo important protections around discipline. The IDEA requires 
schools to take an extra step before enacting long-term suspension or expulsion 
for a child with disabilities.141 Schools must first determine whether the alleged 
misconduct was rooted in disability before enacting long-term discipline.142 If 
behavior is found to be sufficiently tied to the disability, it is found to be a 
“manifestation” of the disability and the school is prevented from enacting the 
long-term discipline.143 The goal instead is to modify the support and services 
offered to the student in an effort to teach her how to change the unwanted 
behavior.144 
No such protections exist for students with disabilities in private schools. 
Rather, students with disabilities who are expelled from private school for 
behaviors related to their disability have no recourse. Parents of children with 
emotional disabilities or other disabilities that impact behavior must trust that 
private schools will continue to work with their children to help them overcome 
these challenges, rather than penalize them. Unfortunately, for some parents, this 
has not been their experience.145 Instead, private schools will admit students with 
behavioral needs, but when behavior does not conform to school rules, rather 
than address those needs, the child is expelled.146 
 
 141 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E)(i)(I)–(II). 
 142 See id. Section 504 and Title II of the ADA require schools to engage in manifestation determinations 
prior to enacting long-term suspensions or expulsions of qualifying students with disabilities. See S-1 ex rel. P-
1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 350 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 143 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E)–(F). 
 144 Id. § 1415(k)(1)(F). 
 145 Shayna A. Pitre, ‘School Choice’ — as Long as Your Child Doesn’t Have a Disability, HUFFINGTON 
POST (July 13, 2014, 5:09 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/shayna-a-pitre/school-choicetrue-choice-
_b_5318677.html (describing three stories of children with disabilities who were excluded from private schools 
through voucher programs due to their disabilities). 
 146 MEG BENNER & REBECCA ULLRICH, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, BETSY DEVOS’ THREAT TO CHILDREN 
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4. School Accountability 
Finally, vouchers severely limit accountability for special education services 
on two fronts. First, individual parents are unable to invoke due process 
procedures to hold private schools accountable for specific failures that relate to 
their children. Second, most voucher legislation requires little to no oversight of 
the private schools that receive public funding. The result: a systemic lack of 
accountability.147 The combined effect of the lack of systemic oversight and 
inability of individual parents to hold private schools accountable is the 
proliferation of rampant fraud and abuse of government funding in voucher 
programs. 
Once parents accept a voucher to enroll students in a private schools, they 
lose the ability to invoke due process protections that would otherwise allow 
them to lodge a complaint about the provision of special education services, 
including type and adequacy of services.148 Further, parents in public schools 
can invoke the right to an expedited appeal of any decision to impose long-term 
suspension or expulsion of their child.149 Parents who enroll their children in 
private schools have no such leverage. 
This inability to hold private schools accountable has led to numerous 
accounts of fraudulent private schools formed purely to take advantage of easy 
access of public funding.150 For example, Ohio’s Dragonfly Academy, a private 
school ostensibly serving students with autism, closed abruptly when allegations 
surfaced that staff were not certified and enrolled students were not receiving 
 
WITH DISABILITIES (2017) (describing the story of a six-year-old kindergartener who was expelled from a private 
school program she attended using a voucher due to behavioral problems stemming from gastrointestinal issues 
and anxiety); see also COPAA REPORT, supra note 4, at 16 (“[M]embers indicate that some schools accept 
children, get their voucher money, and then kick the child out for behavior or other reasons.”). 
 147 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 2, at 55 (“Compared to public school, there is little to no 
oversight, aside from the minimum regarding health and safety. The GAO reports that of the 27 taxpayer-funded 
private school voucher and education savings accounts programs studied by GAO in school year 2016-17, only 
8 of these programs required private schools to comply with annual financial audits, meaning that the states 
funding these schools often have no clear picture of where their investment is actually going.”); NAT’L EDUC. 
ASS’N, POLICY BRIEF: SUBSIDIZING PRIVATE EDUCATION AT TAXPAYER EXPENSE 2 (2017) (finding that no state 
voucher programs for students with disabilities has included accountability measures as robust as those contained 
in the IDEA and the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), formerly the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act (ESEA)); see McLaren, supra note 48 (describing the lack of oversight for the more than $1.3 million in 
special education funding provided to private schools through Indiana’s school voucher program). 
 148 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). 
 149 Id. § 1415(k)(4)(B). 
 150 Church/State FAQ: Dispelling the Myth of “School Choice”, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUND., 
https://ffrf.org/outreach/item/22744-voucherfaq (last visited Mar. 26, 2019). 
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any special education services.151 Another private school in Florida was accused 
of fraudulent Medicaid claims for one-to-one therapy that the children rarely or 
never received.152 
Moreover, public laws mandating annual assessments and other 
accountability and transparency structures in public schools do not necessarily 
apply in private schools.153 A recent audit by the GAO found that while many 
private school choice programs have implemented some forms of academic 
accountability measures, few have financial accountability structures in place.154 
The same audit found “[f]ew of the [fifteen] choice programs that are designed 
specifically for students with disabilities have accountability mechanisms 
related to special education and related services.”155 Many programs failed to 
disclose whether certain accreditation requirements were met or whether 
teachers possessed sufficient specialized skills and training in providing special 
education instruction.156 Such information is critical for parents of students with 
disabilities who want to ensure their children are taught by trained and 
competent professionals.  
State legislatures’ decisions to facilitate the transfer of public funds to 
private schools with minimal oversight is particularly troubling when Congress 
itself signaled its skepticism of the private sector’s ability to properly educate 
 
 151 Lisa Reicosky, Local School for Autistic Kids Abruptly Closes, CANTON REPOSITORY, 
https://www.cantonrep.com/x1018081808/Local-school-for-autistic-kids-abruptly-closes (last updated May 4, 
2012, 4:10 AM). 
 152 Scott Maxwell, Opinion, Shuttered ‘Choice’ School: Where’s the Accountability?, ORLANDO SENTINEL 
(Feb. 28, 2017, 5:00 PM), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-florida-schools-voucher-accountability-
20170228-story.html. 
 153 Several federal laws mandate accountability and transparency in public schools including the ESEA, 
which was reauthorized in 2015 through the ESSA. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 2, at 53 (“Almost 
half of the voucher programs do not have any testing requirement or only have to provide parents with a progress 
report about their children.”); see, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 6841 (2012). The ESSA asks states to administer annual 
assessments in reading and math in grades three through eight and once in high school. Id. States are also 
obligated to report details about student outcomes. See id. § 6841(d). Some states require standardized testing in 
private schools, but others do not. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-94, PRIVATE SCHOOL 
CHOICE: FEDERAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENSURE PARENTS ARE NOTIFIED ABOUT CHANGES IN RIGHTS FOR 
STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 11, 14–15 (2017). 
 154 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-94, PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE: FEDERAL ACTIONS 
NEEDED TO ENSURE PARENTS ARE NOTIFIED ABOUT CHANGES IN RIGHTS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 11, 
14–15 (2017) (finding that two-thirds (eighteen of twenty-seven) of private choice programs include some 
academic testing and reporting requirements, though only nine require administration of state’s standardized 
test). 
 155 Id. at 12. 
 156 Id. at 23 (describing a family who was “surprised to learn that teachers providing special education 
services to their child were not trained to provide those services” and a parent who reported “changing schools 
because they learned aspects of their child’s disability could not be accommodated only after enrolling their 
child in school”). 
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students with disabilities without oversight.157 The IDEA demands some level 
of accountability with the local school districts who distribute federal funds to 
private schools for the provision of special education services.158 The required 
oversight signals a legislative recognition that the private sector is not per se 
better than the public system and cannot simply be left to its own devices. 
Most state voucher programs, however, do not reflect this skepticism or even 
a minimal effort to ward off potential problems.159 Most forgo any form of 
accountability when it comes to the provision of special education services. Even 
the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, the oldest and most well-established 
school choice program in the country160 is riddled with claims of fraud.161 As 
Wisconsin State Representative Mandela Barnes said, “[t]here’s government 
money available for people who want to open up a building and call it a school. 
All you have to do is get the children and all you have to do is come up with a 
catchy slogan.”162 By failing to call for any reasonable oversight of voucher 
programs, state legislatures help create programs ripe for abuse and, at the same 
time, strip parents of the ability to hold these flawed programs accountable. 
B. A Tool of Resegregation 
The second practical effect of vouchers as an education policy is the 
potential that broad use of vouchers will lead to the resegregation of students 
with disabilities.163 This potential outcome is enormously troubling, particularly 
when viewed against the history of the disability rights movement which fought 
 
 157 For example, Congress, through the IDEA, called for oversight of private schools by requiring private 
schools to consult with the local school district about the child find process, the determination of proportionate 
funds available to private school children, and provision of special education services. 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412(a)(10)(A)(iii). 
 158 34 C.F.R. § 300.132 (2018). It also requires that local school districts consult with private schools about 
identification of students with disabilities at private schools as well the provision of special education and related 
services to these children. Id. § 300.134. 
 159 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-94, PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE: FEDERAL 
ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENSURE PARENTS ARE NOTIFIED ABOUT CHANGES IN RIGHTS FOR STUDENTS WITH 
DISABILITIES 34 (2017); COPAA REPORT, supra note 4, at 27–35. 
 160 SCHOOL CHOICE: WISCONSIN—MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM, EDCHOICE, https://www. 
edchoice.org/school-choice/programs/wisconsin-milwaukee-parental-choice-program/# (last visited Mar. 26, 
2019). 
 161 Meghan Dwyer & Stephen Davis, Voucher School Leader Indicted for Stealing Taxpayer Money 
Spotted at New Choice School, FOX6NOW, http://fox6now.com/2016/02/11/voucher-school-leader-indicted-for-
stealing-taxpayer-money-spotted-at-new-milwaukee-choice-school/ (last updated Feb. 12, 2016, 11:10 AM) 
(describing the indictment of Bishop Gregory L. Goner for using $100,000 per year of voucher funding to 
allegedly lease Cadillacs for himself and his family). 
 162 Id. 
 163 See COPAA REPORT, supra note 4, at 17. 
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tirelessly to end the exclusion of students with disabilities from public 
schools.164 Vouchers precipitate segregation in three distinct ways. First, 
students with disabilities who enroll in private schools are at higher risk for 
segregation. They lose the IDEA’s strong presumption favoring education in the 
least restrictive environment (LRE) and thus are at risk for placement in 
segregated settings within the private school without any recourse to challenge 
such settings.165 Second, many voucher programs target students by category of 
disability. These programs facilitate the transfer of students with disabilities 
from inclusive educational settings to segregated schools without access to 
federal due process protections. Finally, to the extent broader voucher policies 
prevent access to private schools for students with severe physical or mental 
disabilities, such policies may aid the exodus of regular education students from 
public schools, while leaving behind those students with disabilities who require 
more costly supports and services to facilitate inclusion. 
1. Waiving the Presumption of Least Restrictive Environment 
Students with disabilities who enroll in private schools lose the IDEA’s 
strong presumption favoring inclusive educational environments.166 Without the 
ability to enforce a right to LRE, students with disabilities can be segregated into 
different classrooms or settings, without regard to whether such settings actually 
improve educational outcomes.167 Excluding students with disabilities from the 
 
 164 Id.  
 165 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2012). If Section 504 applies, through federal funding, then an LRE 
requirement attaches; however, because private schools are permitted to restrict eligibility to only those students 
who meet the “essential eligibility requirements,” they will necessarily screen out those students for whom 
additional supports and services would be needed to ensure education in the regular classroom. 34 C.F.R. 
§ 104.34(a) (2018); see also Molly L. ex rel. B.L. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 194 F. Supp. 2d 422, 436–37 
(E.D. Pa. 2002) (holding that Section 504 requires placement in the LRE that will provide a meaningful 
educational benefit). While Title III of the ADA would apply to prohibit segregation, it, too, is undercut by its 
exception permitting schools to claim that implementing the supports necessary for inclusion would present an 
undue burden. COPAA REPORT, supra note 4, at 23–24. In short, both Section 504 and the ADA enable schools 
to admit only those students for whom the general education classroom would be an appropriate setting with 
minimal supports. 
 166 Cf. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (defining the LRE requirement). Inclusive education means educating 
students with and without disabilities in the same classroom. See id. 
 167 To the extent that Section 504 and Title II of the ADA operate in private schools, both laws also contain 
LRE mandates. 34 C.F.R. § 104.34(a) (2018). But as discussed previously, Title II does not apply to private 
schools, and Section 504 only applies if the school has taken federal funding. Thus, LRE protections through 
these laws are limited by the fact that these laws do not always operate in private schools. Cf. COPAA REPORT, 
supra note 4, at 20–21, 25 (explaining that only “federally funded schools” must always adhere to these federal 
protections). 
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general education classroom ignores more than thirty years of research 
demonstrating the advantages of inclusion.168 
Historically, students with disabilities who were segregated into alternative 
learning environments experienced unequal educational opportunities.169 
Parents of these students fought tirelessly to gain the right to inclusive 
educational environments.170 Research demonstrates when students with 
disabilities are included in regular education environments, they experience 
improved academic, behavioral, and social outcomes.171 Rather than assuming 
students with disabilities are unable to achieve at the level of their peers, the 
IDEA presumes just the opposite. It presumes that students with disabilities 
should be achieving on grade level in all but the most severe cases of cognitive 
impairment.172 Consequently, the law strongly prefers inclusion to support the 
goal of high expectations for students with disabilities.173 
But when students enter private schools, they lose the IDEA’s strong 
presumption favoring inclusive education.174 When in private schools, students 
with disabilities can be removed to a segregated setting to receive all special 
education services regardless of whether the segregated setting is warranted. 
Crucially, segregated settings spurn the core promise of the IDEA, the very 
 
 168 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(A)(i)–(ii); Wayne Sailor & Blair Roger, Rethinking Inclusion: Schoolwide 
Applications, 86 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 503, 504 (2005) (“[T]he sum of available evidence overwhelmingly 
supports integrated instructional approaches over those that are categorically segregated, regardless of the 
categorical label or severity of the disability.”). 
 169 H. Rutherford Turnbull III, Legal Implications, in MAINSTREAMING EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED 
CHILDREN 43, 45–46 (A.J. Pappanikou & James L. Paul eds., 1977) (stating that the mainstreaming preference 
arises from unequal educational opportunities because of the frequent placement of children with special needs 
in the worst facilities with the least capable teachers and poor funding, drawing a comparison to racial 
segregation). 
 170 See generally Mark C. Weber, The Least Restrictive Environment Obligation as an Entitlement to 
Educational Services: A Commentary, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 147 (2001) (detailing an overview of 
seminal cases involving the IDEA’s LRE requirement). 
 171 Jose Blackorby et al., Relationships Between the School Programs of Students with Disabilities and 
Their Longitudinal Outcomes, in SEELS, SRI PROJECT P10656, WHAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE? INFLUENCES ON 
OUTCOMES FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 7-1–7-2, 7-7 (2007) (“Bivariate analyses show that, across 
measures, students with disabilities who took more academic classes in general education settings had greater 
academic success than peers who took fewer classes there.”); XUAN BUI ET AL., MD. COAL. FOR INCLUSIVE 
EDUC., INCLUSIVE EDUCATION RESEARCH & PRACTICE 1, 3 (2010). 
 172 Mark C. Weber, A Nuanced Approach to the Disability Integration Presumption, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 174, 186 (2007). 
 173 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(A). 
 174 Section 504 and Title II of the ADA both contain inclusion mandates similar to the IDEA’s LRE 
requirement. 28 C.F.R. § 35.103 (2018); 34 C.F.R. § 104.34 (2018); see also Letter to Michele Williams, 
Advocates for Children’s Educ. (Mar. 14, 1994) (advising that Section 504’s educational setting regulation set 
forth in § 104.34 is equivalent to the IDEA’s LRE provision and has the same effect of creating a presumption 
in favor of inclusion). 
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reason the statute was enacted—to put an end to the exclusion of students with 
disabilities.175 
2. Targeting Specific Categories of Disability 
Several voucher programs target a certain category of disability and provide 
vouchers to attend schools specializing in the education of children with those 
particular disabilities.176 These programs facilitate resegregation on the basis of 
disability category and ignore the IDEA’s core promise of inclusive education. 
Such settings similarly reject Congress’s intent when enacting both the ADA 
and Section 504—laws designed to prevent the exclusion of persons with 
disabilities.177  
Some would argue that resegregation, if pursued by parents, is not only 
appropriate, but may be preferred. For example, Ohio’s Autism Scholarship 
Program allows parents of children with autism spectrum disorder to choose to 
send their child to a private school specializing in education of autistic 
children.178 Schools or service providers eligible to participate in this program 
must meet certain state requirements including maintaining a staff credentialed 
to provide special education services.179 Because the level of supports and 
services needed by some children with autism are so great, specialized schools 
staffed with people who are trained in the provision of these services seems like 
an obvious answer.180 
There is, however, a crucial difference in the parents making individual 
decisions to leave inclusive settings for more restrictive ones and school districts 
sponsoring and potentially encouraging such movements en masse. While 
highly segregated environments may be required for children with the highest 
 
 175 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2); see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309 (1988). 
 176 NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 14 (listing Arizona’s Empowerment Scholarship 
Account, Florida’s John M. McKay Scholarships for Students with Disabilities Program, Georgia’s Special 
Needs Scholarship Program, Louisiana’s School Choice Pilot Program for Certain Students with 
Exceptionalities, Mississippi’s Dyslexia Therapy Scholarships for Students with Dyslexia Program and Speech-
Language Therapy Scholarship for Students with Speech-Language Impairments programs, and Ohio’s Autism 
Scholarship Program as several states that operate choice programs which limit eligibility to certain categories 
of disability). 
 177 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012). 
 178 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3310.41 (West Supp. 2019); OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC., AUTISM SCHOLARSHIP 
PROGRAM, https://education.ohio.gov/Topics/Other-Resources/Scholarships/Autism-Scholarship-Program (last 
modified Mar. 23, 2019). 
 179 OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 178. 
 180 John McLaughlin, Opinion, Why Model Autism Programs Are Rare in Public Schools, SPECTRUM 
NEWS (July 11, 2017), https://spectrumnews.org/opinion/viewpoint/model-autism-programs-rare-public-
schools/. 
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levels of need, such decisions should still be taken with great care and should be 
highly individualized. When states base voucher programs on categories of 
disability, implicit in those programs is the assumption that all children with a 
certain category of disability need separate learning environments. This 
assumption is not only flawed but dangerous, as it has the potential to move 
larger numbers of children into segregated settings. 
3. Facilitating Exclusion  
Where vouchers are being used as a broad education policy, legislatures 
essentially decide that rather than fix failing public school systems, the state will 
provide parents with the ability to leave that system. But for students with 
disabilities, this is not always a viable option. Private schools are not obligated 
to accept students with disabilities if they are unable to provide them an 
appropriate education with only minor adjustments to their academic 
program.181 For those students for whom the impact of their disability is such 
that they will need specialized educational instruction and related supports, a 
private school is not an option. Consequently, these students are left languishing 
in a failing public school, while those who can leave for more promising options. 
As one scholar stated, “[t]he voucher program, which allows the most ambitious 
families to exit the common schools, threatens the vision of a system in which 
everyone is in the same boat and can only hope to improve his own situation by 
working to improve the situation of all.”182 
Indiana illustrates the phenomenon of expanding voucher eligibility and 
potential for exclusion of students with disabilities. The state prides itself on 
having the largest educational voucher program in the nation, the Choice 
Scholarship Program.183 In the 2016–2017 school year, 34,299 students 
participated, the highest enrollment since its inception in 2011.184 Not 
surprisingly, Indiana’s voucher program also has broad eligibility parameters.185 
While it was originally enacted for low-income students, today there are seven 
“pathways” to eligibility and the income guidelines have gone up 
 
 181 34 C.F.R. § 104.39 (2018). 
 182 Charles Fried, Comment, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
163, 168 (2002). 
 183 Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Mike Pence’s Claim that Indiana has the Largest School Voucher Program, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/08/12/mike-
pences-claim-that-indiana-has-the-largest-school-voucher-program/?utm_term=.719bb854860d. 
 184 IND. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF SCH. FIN., CHOICE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT: 
PARTICIPATION AND PAYMENT DATA 7 (2017). 
 185 CIERNIAK ET AL., supra note 40. 
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dramatically.186 Further, Indiana’s education dollars follow the student, meaning 
that when a student accepts a voucher and applies that money to a private school, 
the student’s zoned public school loses those dollars.187 
Ultimately, a state like Indiana will eventually spend less money in public 
schools as it diverts funding to private schools. Such a structure promises 
massive budget shortfalls for public school systems. Because there are so many 
fixed costs associated with public schools, including building maintenance, 
teacher salaries, and transportation, public schools cannot simply cut costs to 
account for shrinking budgets.188 In fact, this shift of public dollars to private 
schools is already keenly felt in some rural school districts.189 
Glimpsing at this coming trend, the effects of vouchers as a blanket 
education policy has some scholars predicting a dire future for public education. 
One scholar suggested: 
Once a substantial number of students attend private schools, the 
electorate will not want to support public education. Indeed, school 
privatization decisions currently being made could greatly alter the 
nature and structure of education in our nation, perhaps as significantly 
as the common school movement did more than a century ago.190 
 
 186 IND. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 184. The current income caps allow families at 200% of the federal 
free and reduced lunch guidelines to participate (this equates to about $89,900 a year for a family of four), and 
receive a scholarship for up to half of private school tuition. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE 
OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. FEDERAL POVERTY GUIDELINES USED TO 
DETERMINE FINANCIAL ELIGIBILITY FOR CERTAIN FEDERAL PROGRAMS, https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2019). 
 187 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-51-4-4(a)(2) (West Supp. 2018). 
 188 See Derek W. Black, Averting Educational Crisis: Funding Cuts, Teacher Shortages, and the 
Dwindling Commitment to Public Education, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 423, 438–39 (2016) (discussing the growth 
of voucher funding in the face of cuts to funding for traditional public schools). Several studies that assess the 
financial impact of charter schools on public school districts provide important analogous insights and can help 
predict the dangers of siphoning money away from traditional public schools. See, e.g., Robert Bifulco & Randall 
Reback, Fiscal Impacts of Charter Schools: Lessons from New York, 9 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 103 (2014) (finding 
“that charter schools can create fiscal impacts on school districts, particularly in districts with rapid growth in 
charter schools and declining or stagnant enrollment bases); Helen F. Ladd & John D. Singleton, The Fiscal 
Externalities of Charter Schools: Evidence from North Carolina 19 (Nat’l Ctr. for Analysis of Longitudinal Data 
in Educ. Research, Working Paper No. 182, 2018) (finding large and negative fiscal effects of charter schools 
on urban school districts in North Carolina). 
 189 Press Release, Senator Patty Murray, Statement by Senator Patty Murray on the Supreme Court 
Voucher Decision (June 27, 2002), https://www.murray.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2002/6/statement-by-sen-
patty-murray-on-the-supreme-court-voucher-decision; Vouchers Don’t Work in Rural Areas, NAT. COALITION 
FOR PUB. EDUC., https://www.ncpecoalition.org/ruralvouchers (last visited Mar. 26, 2019). 
 190 Martha McCarthy, The Legal Status of School Vouchers: The Saga Continues, 297 WEST’S EDUC. L. 
REP. 655, 671 (2013). 
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Similarly, several disability rights advocacy groups fear that an expansion of 
disability-targeted voucher programs will lead to discrimination, segregation, 
and exclusion of students with disabilities.191 
Critically, voucher expansion presents more than just flawed education 
policy; rather, such legislation represents government’s unconstitutional 
burdening of individual rights. Voucher legislation burdens a particular group, 
students with disabilities, under the guise of providing them a benefit. The 
following Part will analyze vouchers under two legal theories—the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Both demonstrate the serious constitutional concerns 
with school choice. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS 
Setting aside the questionable effectiveness of vouchers as an educational 
policy with respect to students with disabilities, there remains the more central 
concern of their legality. Voucher programs have been challenged under the First 
Amendment’s Establishment Clause, which prohibits government sponsorship 
of religion.192 In that context, the Supreme Court held voucher programs that 
provide funds directly to parents present a “true private choice” and thus, do not 
violate the Establishment Clause.193 While this constitutional question appears 
settled, others remain. This section will analyze two additional constitutional 
principles implicated by voucher legislation: (1) the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine, and (2) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine 
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine arises whenever the government 
offers a gratuitous benefit, but conditions the benefit on the waiver of a 
 
 191 The National Education Association (NEA) issued a policy brief stating, “[v]ouchers would sacrifice 
accountability and civil rights protections for children with special needs without improving the quality of 
services, student achievement, or parental options. Policymakers should instead provide full funding for IDEA.” 
NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, POLICY BRIEF: VOUCHER SCHEMES: A BAD IDEA FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 2 
(2008). 
 192 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002) (holding that the voucher program did 
“not offend the Establishment Clause”). The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause prohibits the government 
from making any law “respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. While some government 
action implicating religion is permissible, there remains some controversy around how much the Establishment 
Clause tolerates. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (5th 
ed. 2015). 
 193 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662–63 (holding that a voucher program facilitated “true private choice” because 
it gave funds directly to parents who could then choose where to commit those funds). 
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constitutional right.194 For example, the government might condition a tax 
exemption on refraining from speech.195 The tax exemption is a gratuitous 
benefit that the government is not obliged to offer, but to take advantage of the 
benefit, one must give up a right to speech. In some instances, such conditions 
are permitted, but in other cases—such as when such a condition is considered 
coercive—courts strike down the condition as unconstitutional.196 As distilled 
by the Supreme Court, the doctrine stands for the principle that the government 
may not act indirectly to produce a result which it could not command 
directly.197 The Court has used the doctrine in the context of tax benefits, 
healthcare, public employment, and business licenses.198 It has been applied to 
invalidate both federal and state laws that infringed upon federal and state 
constitutional rights.199  
Voucher legislation conditions benefits on the waiver of federal and state 
statutory rights and, in some instances, state constitutional rights.200 Because 
vouchers do not implicate federal constitutional rights, the federal 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is not controlling. Yet, the logic behind the 
federal doctrine applies with equal force to the ways in which states condition 
access to vouchers for students with disabilities. States ask these students to give 
up both federal statutory rights and state constitutional rights to get access to a 
voucher.  
The following section will first outline key principles of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine. Next, it will explain why the doctrine provides the right 
framework for voucher legislation despite the absence of infringement on a 
federal constitutional right. Finally, it will demonstrate that when the doctrine is 
applied to analyze vouchers’ effects on students with disabilities, it becomes 
 
 194 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 192, at 1028. 
 195 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528–29 (1958) (holding that a statute denying tax exemption to those 
who could not prove that they did not advocate violent overthrow of government was unconstitutional). 
 196 Compare Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991), with Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. 
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841–42 (1995); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 192, at 1032. 
 197 See Speiser, 357 U.S. at 526. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989). 
 198 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983) (tax benefits); Mem’l Hosp. 
v. Maricopa Cty., 415 U.S. 250, 257–58 (1974) (healthcare); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) 
(public employment); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 595 (1926) (business 
license). 
 199 See State v. Bennett, 867 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015) (holding Minnesota’s test-refusal 
statute does not violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine by imposing a criminal penalty on a person who 
has been arrested for driving while impaired and has refused to submit to a breath test), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
2542 (2016); supra notes 197–98. 
 200 Nine of the fifty state constitutions require public education for students with disabilities. PARKER, 
supra note 20, at 1. 
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clear that states cannot lawfully condition access to vouchers on the waiver of 
affirmative federal statutory rights and state constitutional rights to education. 
1. Principles of Unconstitutional Conditions 
While the Supreme Court has not always been clear and consistent in its 
application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, three basic principles run 
through the Court’s precedent.201 First, the doctrine is only implicated when the 
government attempts an action that would otherwise infringe on constitutional 
rights.202 More specifically, the government indirectly infringes on a 
constitutional right by asking an individual to voluntarily give up that right.203 
Because the government cannot take the right away directly, it asks citizens to 
forgo the right.204 If the government could take away or curtail the right directly, 
the fact that the waiver of the right is attached to a government benefit is 
irrelevant and there is no unconstitutional conditions problem.205 Second, even 
if there is a potential infringement of a constitutional right, the state may justify 
the infringement by showing a relationship between the government’s interest 
in imposing the condition and the constitutional right in question.206 To do so, 
the government must demonstrate that it has a legitimate interest that outweighs 
 
 201 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 407 n.12 (1994) (“Although it has a long history . . . the 
‘unconstitutional conditions’ doctrine has for just as long suffered from notoriously inconsistent application; it 
has never been an overarching principle of constitutional law that operates with equal force regardless of the 
nature of the rights and powers in question.”); see also Sullivan, supra note 197, at 1416. 
 202 Edward J. Fuhr, The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions and the First Amendment, 39 CASE 
WESTERN RESERVE L. REV. 97, 98 (1988) (“This doctrine posits that a condition attached to the grant of a 
governmental benefit is unconstitutional if it requires the relinquishment of a constitutional right. The doctrine 
has been used to invalidate conditions affecting interests protected by the first, fourth, fifth, and fourteenth 
amendments.”). 
 203 Id. at 98–99; Sullivan, supra note 197, at 1421–22 (“Unconstitutional conditions problems arise when 
government offers a benefit on condition that the recipient perform or forego an activity that a preferred 
constitutional right normally protects from government interference. The ‘exchange’ thus has two components: 
the conditioned government benefit on the one hand and the affected constitutional right on the other.”). 
 204 See Sullivan, supra note 197, at 1421–22. 
 205 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 70 (2006) (holding that under 
the Solomon Amendment the federal government could constitutionally withhold funding from universities if 
they refuse to give military recruiters access to school resources). 
 206 In cases that apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to property, and specifically the concept of 
eminent domain, the Supreme Court has held that  
[u]nder the well-settled doctrine of “unconstitutional conditions,” the government may not 
require a person to give up a constitutional right—here the right to receive just compensation 
when property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the 
government where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property. 
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. 
High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). 
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the particular right at issue.207 Third, the government’s attempt to condition the 
right in exchange for the benefit cannot be coercive.208 
In short, the doctrine forbids the government from unduly pressuring 
someone into forfeiting a constitutional right, regardless of whether the person 
ultimately agrees to give up their right in exchange for the benefit.209 The focus 
is on the coercive nature of the bargain itself, rather than the end result, and does 
not turn on the gratuitous nature of the benefit.210 In fact, as the Court has noted, 
“virtually all of our unconstitutional conditions cases involve a gratuitous 
governmental benefit of some kind,” including tax benefits, healthcare, and 
public employment, yet the issue does not turn on whether or not the government 
is obligated to provide the benefit.211 
Judges have, on occasion, invoked the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
to analyze state legislation that infringes on state constitutional rights. For 
instance, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has identified three factors it will 
analyze when a government entity seeks to condition the receipt of a public 
benefit on a waiver of a California state constitutional right.212 The government 
must establish the following: “(1) the conditions reasonably relate to purposes 
sought by the legislation which confers benefit; (2) the value accruing to the 
public from imposition of those conditions manifestly outweighs any resulting 
impairment of constitutional rights; and (3) there are no alternative means less 
subversive of constitutional right” that could achieve the same purpose.213 As 
with the federal unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the purpose of this state 
doctrine is to analyze the relationship between the legislation and the behavior 
 
 207 Lorenz v. State, 928 P.2d 1274, 1283–84 (Colo. 1996) (holding that a statute prohibiting certain elected 
and appointed officials from holding gaming licenses did not impose an unconstitutional condition on the right 
to ballot access or the right to hold public office because the restriction imposed only a limited burden on ballot 
access, right to public office, and voters’ ability to exercise preferences, which was outweighed by the State’s 
substantial interest in avoiding corruption and appearance of corruption in the gaming industry and local 
government). 
 208 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 606 (2013) (“In so holding, we have 
recognized that regardless of whether the government ultimately succeeds in pressuring someone into forfeiting 
a constitutional right, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine forbids burdening the Constitution’s enumerated 
rights by coercively withholding benefits from those who exercise them.”). 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. at 608 (“We have repeatedly rejected the argument that if the government need not confer a benefit 
at all, it can withhold the benefit because someone refuses to give up a constitutional right.”). 
 211 Id. at 608 (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983) (tax 
benefits); Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cty., 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (healthcare); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 
(1972) (public employment); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 71 (1936) (crop payments); Frost & Frost 
Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 592–93 (1926) (business license)). 
 212 Sanchez v. Cty. of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 930 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 649 (2007). 
 213 Id. 
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the government is seeking to compel. In California, for example, the government 
bears the heavy burden of demonstrating the practical necessity for limitation of 
the state constitutional right.214 Other state courts have applied the doctrine to 
help analyze state laws that affect state constitutional due process rights215 and 
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.216 While the 
doctrine may not be a frequent player in state courts, precedent exists 
demonstrating its value in testing the limits of state-imposed conditions on state 
constitutional rights. 
2. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine as a Framework for 
Analyzing Vouchers 
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine provides a powerful framework for 
analyzing the position in which some voucher programs place students with 
disabilities: they compel students to waive their federal statutory and state 
constitutional educational rights in exchange for escaping public schools that 
may already be violating their rights. As with other infringements on rights, here 
the doctrine can be used to analyze the relationship between voucher legislation 
and the behavior the government is seeking to compel—the relinquishment of 
educational rights.  
While scholars differ about the purpose of the doctrine and whether a 
unifying theory exists such that it can be applied consistently across all contexts, 
one principle offered by Professor Kathleen Sullivan is particularly salient in the 
voucher context.217 Sullivan suggests the doctrine is most important in regard to 
“preferred liberties.”218 Essentially, preferred liberties simply cannot be 
sacrificed. Without the doctrine, the government is subject to nothing more than 
 
 214 Id. 
 215 Gonya v. Comm’r, N.H. Ins. Dep’t, 899 A.2d 278, 282 (N.H. 2006) (applying an unconstitutional 
conditions analysis to a state regulation seeking to restrict New Hampshire’s constitutional right to redress 
actionable injuries). 
 216 Univ. of Colo. ex rel. Regents of the Univ. of Colo. v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929, 946 (Colo. 1993) 
(conditioning participation in intercollegiate sports at a state university on “voluntary consent” to random 
suspicionless drug testing was a violation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine); State v. Bernard, 859 
N.W.2d 762, 767 (Minn. 2015) (holding a warrantless breath test that defendant refused would not have been an 
unconstitutional search because it would have been a valid search incident to a lawful arrest); State v. Bennett, 
867 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2542 (2016). 
 217 Professor Kathleen Sullivan recommended courts use the doctrine to scrutinize the distribution of 
power “between government and rightholders . . . , constitutional rights among rightholders,” and “to the extent 
that a condition discriminates de facto between those who do and do not depend on a government benefit, [to] 
create a de facto caste hierarchy in the enjoyment of constitutional rights.” Sullivan, supra note 197, at 1490. 
 218 Id. at 1419. Professor Sullivan opines that the doctrine is helpful in “identif[ying] a characteristic 
technique by which government appears not to, but in fact does burden those liberties, triggering a demand for 
especially strong justification by the state.” Id. 
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rational basis review, even though the effect of its action is to limit citizens’ 
access to “preferred liberties.”219 Under rational basis review, the government 
can successfully put forth virtually any justification to demonstrate a 
constitutionally permissible need for its proposed restriction of rights.220 The 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine serves as an important limit. The doctrine 
asks whether the government’s gratuitous benefit, when conditioned on the 
relinquishment of a particularly important right, demands stronger justification 
than the minimum required under rational basis review.221 The need for the 
higher standard is based in part on the importance of the right at issue.  
Public education is a right so central to the functioning of our democratic 
society that it simply cannot be sacrificed on a whim. As the following sections 
describe, students with disabilities have both state constitutional and federal 
statutory rights to education. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine provides 
a useful framework for weighing the competing interests at issue in legislation 
that seeks both to condition these educational rights and relieve the state from 
the obligation to provide public education. 
a. State Constitutional Rights 
All fifty state constitutions contain a right to education.222 While the exact 
nature of the right differs by state, for purposes of this analysis, the important 
point is that access to public education generally implicates a state constitutional 
right. As such, conditions on that right should be subject to the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine. While no state has applied the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine to education, several state courts have applied the doctrine to 
infringements of other state constitutional rights.223 Thus, a similar analysis 
should presumptively apply to state voucher programs that condition access to 
waiver of the state’s responsibility to fulfill the right to an education. 
Moreover, education ranks among the most important rights in our 
democracy.224 Several state supreme courts have held education to be a 
fundamental right under their respective state constitutions.225 Others have 
 
 219 See id. at 1425. 
 220 See infra Section III.B.1. 
 221 Sullivan, supra note 197, at 1425. 
 222 PARKER, supra note 20. 
 223 See supra notes 212–216 and accompanying text. 
 224 See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[E]ducation is perhaps the 
most important function of state and local governments.”). 
 225 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 957–58 (Cal. 1976) (finding education to be a fundamental 
right and deeming California’s school finance system to be unconstitutional); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 
RAJ_6.4.2019_PUBLICAITON COPY 6/4/2019 11:46 AM 
1074 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1037 
simply declared students to have a constitutional right to a quality education.226 
All are premised on a similar rationale that values education as a core democratic 
right. As described by Kentucky’s Constitution, “the education of young people 
is essential to the prosperity of a free people.”227 Vouchers ask students with 
disabilities to give up this elemental right—a state constitutional right to a 
system of publicly funded education.228 
Precedent makes clear that the state cannot directly undermine the right to 
education. It cannot make students’ access to it depend on where they live, how 
rich their districts are, or the special needs a student may have.229 A few cases 
have gone so far as to say that this right is not even conditioned on the students’ 
good behavior.230 Even when students engage in serious misbehavior, the state 
 
372–74 (Conn. 1977) (holding education to be a fundamental right based on state compulsory attendance laws 
and Connecticut state constitutional provisions); see also Robyn K. Bitner, Note, Exiled from Education: Plyler 
v. Doe’s Impact on the Constitutionality of Long-Term Suspensions and Expulsions, 101 VA. L. REV. 763, 768 
(2015). 
 226 Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 294 (N.J. 1973) (finding New Jersey’s system of financing public 
education violative of the state’s constitutional mandate to provide for “equal educational opportunity”); 
Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C. 1997) (right to education provided in state constitution is qualitative 
and encompasses right to “sound basic education . . . preparing students to participate and compete in the 
society”); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999) (holding South Carolina’s 
Constitution “require[d] the General Assembly to provide the opportunity for each child to receive a minimally 
adequate education”); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979) (holding West Virginia Constitution 
education clause provided a fundamental right to education); Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 
606 P.2d 310, 337 (Wyo. 1980) (finding a state system of local property taxes unconstitutional under equal 
protection). Not all states have adopted this posture. See, e.g., Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798 (Ill. 1999) 
(holding education was not a fundamental right under Illinois state laws); State ex rel. Shineman v. Bd. of Educ., 
42 N.W.2d 168, 170 (Neb. 1950) (holding education was not a fundamental right under the Nebraska 
Constitution). 
 227 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 205–06 (Ky. 1989) (holding that four justifications 
existed for treatment of education as a fundamental right: “1) The education of young people is essential to the 
prosperity of a free people. 2) The education should be universal and should embrace all children. 3) Public 
education should be supervised by the State, to assure that students develop patriotism and understand our 
government. 4) Education should be given to all—rich and poor—so that our people will be homogeneous in 
their feelings and desires.”). 
 228 All fifty states contain an education clause in their constitution. PARKER, supra note 20. Nine states 
contain an additional clause specifically addressing students with disabilities. Id. Such disability-focused 
educational clauses vary with respect to categories of disability covered as well as substantive rights granted. 
See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11. 
 229 Horton v. Marshall Pub. Sch., 769 F.2d 1323, 1324, 1334 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding the school district’s 
application of “domicile requirement” to deny enrollment to minor children whose parent or guardian was not 
living in the district violated Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 
A.2d 1353, 1360 (N.H. 1997) (holding a “system of financing public education” through school taxes assessed 
in school districts was disproportionate and unreasonable within the meaning of a constitutional provision 
requiring proportional tax assessments and state-funded public schools). 
 230 Cathe A. v. Doddridge Cty. Bd. of Educ., 490 S.E.2d 340, 350–51 (W. Va. 1997) (holding that only in 
extreme cases and through strict scrutiny review could a child taken out of a regular school for disciplinary 
reasons be denied all public education opportunities). 
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remains obligated to provide for their education.231 In fact, complete 
deprivations of education are typically subject to heightened scrutiny.232 The 
notion that the state might ask a student to waive this right to education and 
achieve indirectly what it cannot achieve directly is contrary to the right itself. 
Yet, this is exactly what state voucher programs seemingly attempt to do—shed 
state obligations to educate students with disabilities. Thus, the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine and the logic behind it are necessary to ensure limits on 
states’ behavior when the state constitutional right to education is at issue. 
b. Federal Statutory Rights 
In addition to state constitutional rights to education, students with 
disabilities have rights under federal statutes.233 These federal statutory rights 
are meant to support students’ ability to access their state constitutional right to 
education.234 But, importantly, federal statutes also confer a substantive right to 
FAPE.235 In this respect, the federal statutes play a dual role. They bestow 
students with disabilities a substantive right to FAPE and they ensure students 
with disabilities are given necessary special education and related supports they 
require to access their state constitutional right to education.236 
As with the state constitutional right to education, in many cases students 
with disabilities are asked to give up federal statutory protections in exchange 
for a voucher.237 These federal rights include not only their substantive right to 
 
 231 Id. at 350. 
 232 Id. 
 233 See supra Section I.B. All states must adopt their own state regulations to enforce the terms of the 
IDEA. Some states provide students with disabilities additional rights through state statutes. See, e.g., MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71B, §§ 1–16 (West 2009). This state law guarantees a “free and appropriate public 
education in the least restrictive environment” to all school-aged children (ages 3 to 21) regardless of disability. 
Id. §§ 1–2. Any child who qualifies for special education services will receive services specified in an IEP. Id. 
§ 3. A team of interested parties, which could include educators, parents, physicians, and advocates, develops 
the plan. Id. The law also mandates support for children with disabilities who may be bullied. Id. 
 234 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (2012) (describing that prior to enactment of the EAHCA of 1975, the educational 
needs of millions of children with disabilities were not being met because they were effectively excluded from 
school, thus these children were denied their state constitutional right to education. The EAHCA was enacted to 
prevent such exclusion of children with disabilities from their state constitutional right to education); see also 
Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of the D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. 
Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 302–03 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (approving consent decree that enjoined Pennsylvania 
from denying education to students who were “mentally retarded”). 
 235 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). See generally Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 
S. Ct. 988, 995–96 (2017) (affirming that the IDEA required states to confer a “substantively adequate program 
of education”). 
 236 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012). 
 237 NAT. COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, CHOICE & VOUCHERS – IMPLICATIONS FOR STUDENTS WITH 
DISABILITIES 24 (2018), https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_Choice-Vouchers_508_0.pdf. 
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FAPE, but also the right to be free from segregated learning environments, and 
the right to invoke due process to complain about the loss of such rights.238 Some 
voucher programs require parents to explicitly waive their rights to invoke 
federal statutory protections for students with disabilities as a condition of 
acceptance of the voucher.239 For example, under the Succeed Scholarship 
Program for Students with Disabilities in Arkansas, parents must “sign an 
acknowledgement that, by enrolling a child in a private school, the 
parent . . . waives the procedural safeguards granted by the IDEA.”240 
While the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has never been applied to 
federal statutory rights, the nature of these particular federal rights and the close 
connection to a state constitutional right provides a compelling basis for 
applying the same analysis. As a practical matter, it is simply impossible to 
disentangle the federal statutory rights from the state constitutional right to 
education. The federal rights facilitate the delivery of the state constitutional 
right, and voucher programs ask students to give up both.241 Thus, ceding 
statutory rights under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA equates to the loss 
of the state constitutional right to education. 
More specifically, these federal disability laws ensure equality of access to 
education.242 Without such guarantees in place, students with disabilities lose 
the tools they may require to meaningfully engage with curricula.243 And without 
protections of the federal laws, a state constitutional right to education can 
become meaningless. By virtue of the loss of rights under the federal statutes 
that were enacted to guarantee equal access to education, students with 
disabilities also lose their ability to access their state constitutional right to 
education. States should no more be able to require students to waive their state 
constitutional right to education than states should be able to require students to 
waive the predicates to receiving full access to the state constitutional right.  
Just as with restrictions on states’ constitutional rights to education, the 
condition on federal statutory rights is an attempt to compel a result which the 
 
 238 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(5), 1415. 
 239 NAT. COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 237, at 59.  
 240 ARK. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 121. 
 241 NAT. COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 237, at 65 (“[F]ederal IDEA rights, as a general rule, have 
not been viewed as being extended to children and youth with disabilities who participate in voucher 
programs.”). 
 242 See Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, 137 S. Ct. 743, 748-50 (2017) (discussing how the IDEA 
Section 504, and the ADA protect students’ interests). 
 243 Students lose the right to FAPE individualized supports and services, the right to be placed in inclusive 
environments with nondisabled peers, and the right to invoke due process protections to enforce such rights. 20 
U.S.C. § 1412. 
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government could not otherwise achieve without violating the law.244 In this 
instance, when parents accept conditions on access to federal statutes, states are 
no longer responsible for providing FAPE or ensuring students with disabilities 
are educated in inclusive environments.245 States could not relinquish these 
federal obligations without requiring such “voluntary” conditions. Rather, it is 
only through enforcement of the condition attached to vouchers that states are 
freed from these obligations. 
As Professor Sullivan warns, government action of this sort can “alter the 
balance of power between government and rightholders.”246 Without the waiver, 
students with disabilities have a significant number of legal protections that, in 
effect, give them the power to control their education and ensure its quality. But 
by asking students to waive those rights, states severely rebalance that power. 
They essentially force students with disabilities to indemnify the government for 
its failure to provide them with educational benefits. And interestingly, it is only 
with regard to this subpopulation that states pursue such a broad waiver, raising 
the possibility that the states’ true interest is in extinguishing the rights 
themselves, not pursuing some other legitimate purpose. 
Assuming now that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is a proper tool 
with which to analyze vouchers as applied to students with disabilities, the final 
section will evaluate the constitutionality of vouchers using the doctrine. 
3. Evaluating the Constitutionality of the Conditions on Vouchers 
As a general principal, states are not free to eschew either state or federal 
obligations. The question presented here is whether they can do so by imposing 
conditions on vouchers.247 Once a right has been conditioned, the primary 
questions under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine are (1) the legitimacy 
of the government interest and (2) the coercive nature of the bargain. While a 
court may be more willing to apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
when the states’ constitutional rights to education are implicated than when only 
federal statutory rights are in play, the analysis is the same in either scenario. 
 
 244 States could not ordinarily refuse to comply with federal and state statutes providing for the education. 
See COPAA REPORT, supra note 4, at 20–25. 
 245 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); 29 U.S.C. § 794. 
 246 Sullivan, supra note 197, at 1490. Sullivan recommends courts use the doctrine to scrutinize any 
government condition that threatens to skew the balance of power between the government and the people 
holding the right, or the distribution of rights among people, to create a de facto “caste hierarchy in the enjoyment 
of constitutional rights.” Id. 
 247 “It is clear that a funding condition cannot be unconstitutional if it could be constitutionally imposed 
directly.” Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59–60 (2006). 
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Thus, the following section will discuss the analysis under both without drawing 
distinctions between state constitutional rights and federal statutory rights to 
education. 
a. Legitimacy of the Government Interest 
The Supreme Court has looked to the legitimacy of the government interests 
at issue when the government seeks to entice a waiver of a constitutional right. 
For instance, in Lorenz v. State,248 the Court held that a statute prohibiting certain 
elected and appointed officials from holding gaming licenses did not impose an 
unconstitutional condition on the right to hold public office because the 
restriction imposed was outweighed by the state’s substantial interests in 
avoiding corruption and the appearance of corruption in the gaming industry and 
local government.249 In the criminal law context, the Court has upheld the 
practice of impeachment on cross-examination of a defendant despite its 
infringement on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
because of the interest it serves—strengthening the reliability of the criminal 
process.250 In the property law context, the Court held that a California public 
land commission could not, without paying compensation, condition permission 
to rebuild a house on the property owners’ transfer of a public easement across 
beachfront property.251 Looking to the underlying interest at issue, the Court 
found “[t]he evident constitutional propriety” of prohibiting a land use 
“disappears . . . if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to 
further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition.”252 Finally, in 
Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, the Court held that a federal grant restriction 
on funds to legal services nonprofits, prohibiting lawyers from challenging 
welfare laws, was an unconstitutional condition.253 The Court warned that, “[w]e 
must be vigilant when Congress imposes rules and conditions which in effect 
insulate its own laws from legitimate judicial challenge.”254 
Per the Court’s analysis in unconstitutional conditions cases, a condition will 
be considered legitimate if the competing state interest which induced the 
condition is substantial.255 A condition will fail to meet this standard if it “utterly 
 
 248 928 P.2d 1274 (Colo. 1996) (en banc). 
 249 Id. at 1285–86. 
 250 Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958). 
 251 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831–32 (1987). 
 252 Id. at 836–37. 
 253 531 U.S. 533, 548–49 (2001). 
 254 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548 (2001). 
 255 See supra Section III.A.1. 
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fails to further the end advanced as justification.”256 With respect to vouchers 
and students with disabilities, state governments’ self-described interests fall 
into three categories: (1) fiscal savings, (2) increased efficiencies, and (3) 
improved educational outcomes. While the stated interests may seem innocuous 
at first, each comes at great cost to students with disabilities and upon closer 
inspection, the unstated but undeniable effect is to free the state of its obligation 
to provide students with disabilities equal educational opportunities, an interest 
surely not worthy of a substantial restriction on educational rights. 
Fiscal savings is often cited by lawmakers and advocacy groups as a 
rationale to support school voucher legislation.257 Essentially, they claim a 
savings occurs because it costs less to provide a voucher for a child to attend 
private school than to educate that child in public schools.258 Moreover, 
legislators claim this savings is recouped at higher levels with respect to students 
with disabilities because this cohort cost twice as much to educate.259 Costs 
associated with educating students with disabilities has long strained state 
education budgets, in part because the IDEA places significant demands on 
states in return for federal funding, but Congress has yet to fully fund the 
program.260 Since its enactment, the law has included a commitment to pay 40% 
of the average per student cost for every special education student.261 However, 
currently the federal government provides local school districts with less than 
20% of its promised commitment.262 
 
 256 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836–37. 
 257 SPALDING, supra note 5, at 39; Martin Lueken, How to Accurately Calculate the Fiscal Impact of 
School Voucher Programs, EDCHOICE BLOG (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.edchoice.org/blog/how-to-
accurately-calculate-the-fiscal-impact-of-school-voucher-programs/. 
 258 “The most relevant relationship in calculating the fiscal impact of school choice is the difference 
between: (1) the amount of financial assistance (i.e., the voucher amount) provided to participants and (2) the 
current cost of educating those students in the public school system. If the average voucher amount is less than 
the average per-student educational cost, a savings is realized for those students that use a voucher to leave a 
public school to enroll in a private school.” SPALDING, supra note 5, at 1. 
 259 Id. at 12. One advocacy group even praised Arizona and Louisiana’s policy of offering a voucher worth 
less than the amount the state would otherwise spend on educating a student with a disability in a public school 
precisely because of the fiscal savings. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 34. 
 260 See 231 Nat’l Educ. Ass’n (NEA), Background of Special Education and the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): The 2004 IDEA Reauthorization Bill, http://www.nea.org/home/19029.htm 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2019). 
 261 Background of Special Education and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): The 
2004 IDEA Reauthorization Bill, NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, http://www.nea.org/home/19029.htm (last visited Mar. 
26, 2019). 
 262 Id. (noting that in 2004 the “average per student cost [was] $7,552 and the average cost per special 
education student [was] an additional $9,369 per student, or $16,921. Yet, in 2004, the federal government [was] 
providing local school districts with just under 20 percent of its commitment rather than the 40 percent specified 
by the law”). 
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Setting aside for the moment the active debate over whether such cost 
savings is actually realized through voucher legislation,263 the relevant question 
for purposes of the unconstitutional conditions analysis is whether fiscal savings 
justifies the infringement of educational rights. The argument falls flat for two 
reasons. First, state governments need not condition the rights of students with 
disabilities to enact voucher legislation. Thus, assuming such legislation 
provides a fiscal savings, they could still enact it without restricting students’ 
rights under federal and state laws. In short, the ends are not necessary to justify 
the means. 
Second, given the historical weight accorded to the nature of educational 
rights, including the fact that such rights are embedded in all fifty state 
constitutions,264 it seems unlikely that fiscal concerns alone would permit 
governments to condition voucher legislation on a waiver of access to 
educational rights. This is particularly true given that such a condition is not a 
necessary component to enacting such legislation. If the state needs the 
education system to reduce or control costs, one would expect the state to pursue 
that through efficiency within the system, not by removing individuals from the 
system itself. 
In some states, voucher programs have gotten so big that they are causing 
deficits in state education budgets.265 The savings resulting from vouchers are 
not actually recouped in the public school system, but rather recouped by the 
state budget more broadly.266 It is at least arguable that states enacting voucher 
 
 263 One of the largest pro-voucher interest groups, the Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, 
authored a report claiming a cumulative total savings of $1.7 billion dollars from school voucher programs 
between 1991 and 2011. SPALDING, supra note 5, at 12. The report claimed that students with special education 
needs cost school districts on average twice as much as regular education students. Id. at 12, 39; see also U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ., Educ. Res. Info. Ctr. (ERIC), Jeopardizing a Legacy: A Closer Look at IDEA and Florida’s 
Disability Voucher Program 8–10 (2003). Yet, compare the Department of Education Report with the current 
calls for a halt to Indiana’s voucher program, where the Indiana state superintendent stated, “[f]or too long, 
Indiana has diverted funding from public schools without studying the impact on our traditional school system. 
It is time for our state legislature to fully study the fiscal and academic impacts that the school voucher system 
is having on Indiana’s education system.” Claire McInerny, School Voucher Program Cost State $18 Million 
More than Previous Year, WFYI INDIANAPOLIS (July 19, 2016), http://www.wfyi.org/news/articles/school-
voucher-program-cost-state-18-million-more-than-previous-year. 
 264 See PARKER, supra note 20. 
 265 See Valerie Strauss, What Taxpayers Should Know About the Cost of School Choice, WASH. POST (Jan. 
26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2017/01/26/what-taxpayers-should-know-
about-the-public-cost-of-school-choice/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6b9f9a36690c. 
 266 Julie F. Mead, The Right to an Education or the Right to Shop for Schooling: Examining Voucher 
Programs in Relation to State Constitutional Guarantees, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 703, 721 (2015). Mead argues 
that where state constitutions require a duty to provide uniform education, voucher programs that siphon off 
money from public schools may at some point violate state constitutional obligation to provide for public 
education. Id. at 704–05, 714. 
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programs that drain state coffers of education funding are in danger of running 
afoul of their commitment to provide for a system of public education.267 In these 
states the justification of fiscal savings is in tension with a duty to provide a 
uniform system of public education.268 Consequently, fiscal savings may not be 
a legitimate legislative goal if it comes at the expense of meeting the states’ 
constitutional obligations to provide a public system of education. 
A second legislative interest advanced for the creation of vouchers is 
efficiency. The National Conference of State Legislatures has lauded voucher 
programs’ ability to both cut costs and ease the administrative burden of 
compliance with the IDEA. “By shifting students with disabilities out of the 
public school system, the administrative burden of tracking and reporting 
student progress is reduced at both the local and state levels.”269 Schools have a 
number of reporting requirements that they must meet in order to comply with 
IDEA’s terms, and while efforts have been made to minimize these 
requirements, they nonetheless place significant demands on school districts.270 
When students accept vouchers to attend private schools, the reporting 
requirements are virtually extinguished.271 States may have their own reporting 
mandates built into their voucher legislation, but most states require only limited 
reporting or none at all.272  
Another component of efficiency is schools’ ability to offer parents a direct 
path into the private school system while avoiding costly litigation. The IDEA 
empowers students and their parents to invoke due process procedures to file 
complaints about the adequacy of FAPE.273 If parents can prove the public 
school denied their child FAPE, they may be able to seek tuition reimbursement 
for a private school placement.274 In fact, the robust nature of the IDEA’s due 
 
 267 Id. at 737. 
 268 Id. at 736–37. 
 269 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 34; see also SPALDING, supra note 5, at 2, 9–10. 
 270 20 U.S.C. § 1408 (2012). 
 271 Elise Helgesen Aguilar, A New Government Report Shows Private School Voucher Programs Fail to 
Provide Information, Especially to Families of Students with Disabilities, AMS. UNITED FOR SEPARATION 
CHURCH & ST. (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.au.org/blogs/wall-of-separation/a-new-government-report-shows-
private-school-voucher-programs-fail-to. School districts must still track the number of students with disabilities 
in private schools, but their data gathering for this cohort of students is greatly reduced per federal law. 
 272 Marie Rauschenberger, Resolving the Lack of Private-School Accountability in State-Funded Special 
Education Voucher Programs, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1125, 1152–53 (2015). 
 273 See supra Part II. 
 274 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii); see also Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 258–59 (2009) 
(Souter, J., dissenting). Public perception of the frequency and costs of such claims on school districts may 
overstate the actual cost. See JAY P. GREENE & MARCUS A. WINTERS, DEBUNKING A SPECIAL EDUCATION MYTH: 
DON’T BLAME PRIVATE OPTIONS FOR RISING COSTS 67–68, 70 (2007) (comparing several articles featuring high 
costs of individual students’ private school tuitions on public school districts, with data on actual numbers of 
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process system has engendered calls from school superintendents to scale back 
its force.275 School districts, understandably, would prefer to limit the costs 
associated with defending lawsuits, and many state legislatures see vouchers as 
a way to limit those costs and head off litigation.276 Voucher legislation offers 
parents who are unhappy with the public school system a relatively direct 
method of leaving it. Vouchers incentivize parents to forgo the potentially costly 
and lengthy litigation to improve services in public schools for the more 
immediate promise of better services in a private school. 
While administrative efficiency in and of itself may be a legitimate goal, 
when the purpose of efficiency is an end run around federal disability rights 
legislation, that goal should face more scrutiny. The IDEA requires states to 
submit reports to the Department of Education to ensure that states are fulfilling 
their statutory obligations to students with disabilities.277 A state’s desire to get 
out from under these reporting requirements is essentially a desire to avoid or 
outsource that obligation. Thus, the goal of efficiency is to push the costly and 
administratively burdensome responsibility to educate students with disabilities 
onto private actors, who are under no such reporting obligation. 
Likewise, incentivizing parents to accept vouchers and waive due process 
protections is inherently suspect. The condition merely operates as a way for the 
 
students publicly placed in private schools). In 2004, only about 1.48% of students with disabilities were enrolled 
in publicly funded private placements (amounting to 0.18% of the public school student population). Id. 
 275 Sasha Pudelski, AASA, Rethinking Special Education Due Process: A Proposal for the Next 
Reauthorization of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 2 (2016). The School Superintendents 
Association recently authored a report detailing the costs associated with defending due process claims and 
recommending that a type of mandatory mediation (referred to as consultation) be implemented prior to the 
filing of any lawsuit. Id. at 4. Among its findings based on a survey of 200 school superintendents, “the current 
due process system continues to expend considerable school district resources and impedes the ability of school 
personnel to provide enhanced academic experiences for all students with disabilities because it devotes the 
district’s precious time and resources to fighting the legal actions of a single parent.” Id. at 2. 
The average legal fees for a district involved in a due process hearing were $10,512.50. Districts 
compelled to compensate parents for their attorney’s fees averaged $19,241.38. The expenditures 
associated with the verdict of the due process hearing averaged districts $15,924.14. For districts 
that chose to settle with a parent prior to the adjudication of the due process hearing, the 
settlement costs averaged $23,827.34. 
Id. at 3. 
 276 Nat Malkus & Tim Keller, Federal Special Education Law and State School Choice Programs, 18 
Federalist Soc’y Rev. 22, 26 (2017) (“Where available, educational choice programs offer another path for 
families that are dissatisfied with the IDEA-guaranteed IEP by giving them financial assistance to access 
nonpublic educational alternatives. Importantly, they do this without subjecting parents to the costly and time-
consuming litigation or drawn-out due process procedures they would face under IDEA alone.”); see also 
COPAA REPORT, supra note 4, at 13. 
 277 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(5)(B). 
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state to insulate itself from legal challenges—an action the Supreme Court has 
previously found violates the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.278 When 
viewed in this light, states appear to be using “efficiency” as a cloak for shedding 
their statutory responsibilities towards students with disabilities. 
Finally, state legislators and voucher proponents frequently claim that school 
choice empowers parents to choose a school most effective for their child.279 
They claim that giving more parents the ability to choose the best performing 
school will in turn improve the quality of schools for all children.280 Thus, the 
justification for shifting public funds into the private sector is the promise of 
better schools for all children. 
Recent research demonstrates otherwise. Several recent reports indicate that 
at best voucher students show no improvement in student achievement, and at 
worst such programs actually hurt student performance.281 Here, the offered 
goal—privatization of education to improve outcomes—does not square with 
the actual result. As in prior cases where the Court imposed the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine, here the “condition . . . utterly fails to further the end 
advanced as the justification.”282 Thus, it is at least arguable that the condition 
permits a restriction of civil rights in order to achieve an undesirable outcome. 
In addition to weighing the state interest in enacting the condition, the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine tells courts to consider whether coercion 
exists in the nature of the bargain between the condition and the benefit. The 
following section will analyze whether coercion exists with respect to vouchers. 
 
 278 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001). 
 279 Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos went so far as referring to opponents of school choice as “‘flat 
Earthers’ who have ‘chilled creativity’ and held American students back.” Gregory Wallace, Education 
Secretary: School Choice Opponents Have ‘Chilled Creativity’, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/22/politics/ 
betsy-devos-school-choice-trump-budget/ (last updated May 22, 2017, 10:24 PM) (“‘They will be hurting the 
children and families who can least afford it. If politicians in a state block education choice, it means those 
politicians do not support equal opportunity for all kids,’ DeVos said.”). 
 280 NAT. COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 237, at 9.  
 281 Douglas N. Harris, Brown Ctr. on Educ. PolICy at Brookings, Why Managed Competition Is Better 
than a Free Market for Schooling 2 (2017). Recent studies of voucher programs in Ohio and Louisiana show 
voucher students perform worse than non-voucher students. DAVID FIGLIO & KRZYSZTOF KARBOWNIK, THOMAS 
B. FORDHAM INST., EVALUATION OF OHIO’S EDCHOICE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM: SELECTION, COMPETITION, 
AND PERFORMANCE EFFECTS 2 (2016) (finding decline in math scores that cannot be attributed to “setbacks that 
typically accompany any change in schools”); Jonathan N. Mills et al., Educ. Research All. for New Orleans, 
How Has the Louisiana Scholarship Program Affected Students? A Comprehensive Summary of Effects after 
Two Years 2 (2016). 
 282 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
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b. Coercive Nature of the Bargain 
Coercion, while central to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,283 
remains difficult to precisely define.284 Professor Mitchell Berman defines 
coercion in this context as “state action that burdens exercise of a constitutional 
right for the purpose of either discouraging or punishing assertion of that 
right.”285 States impermissibly burden a right if the purpose of the condition is 
either punitive or meant to discourage the exercise of the right.286 
Critiques of such a limiting principle often point to the view that government 
should be able to condition any benefit that it was not obligated to provide. But, 
the Supreme Court has already rejected this greater-includes-the-lesser 
argument as being a “facile generalization” that “obscure[s] the issue.”287 
Further, as Professor Berman opines, “it is entirely plausible that an individual 
may be better off in a world in which the benefit at issue is withheld entirely 
than in a world in which it is offered on a condition that she, but not others, 
would reject.”288 This hypothetical presents a realistic vision of the future for 
students with disabilities who reside in states with expansive voucher 
programs.289 
The Court has used coercion as a reason to strike down conditions that affect 
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, religion, and association. For 
example, the Court suggested that a public college would violate a professor’s 
freedom of speech if it declined to renew his contract because he was critical of 
the college’s administration.290 Most recently, the Supreme Court held that a 
 
 283 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 597 (2013). 
 284 Compare Sullivan, supra note 197 (arguing that coercion is not the correct lens through which to view 
the Court’s analysis in these cases), with Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional 
Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1 (2001) (supplying a new framework in which coercion is one 
piece of an unconstitutional conditions analysis, but also arguing that even noncoercive proposals may be 
unconstitutional). 
 285 Berman, supra note 284, at 7. 
 286 Id. at 35. 
 287 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952). 
 288 Berman, supra note 284, at 18–19. 
 289 Florida has one voucher program with 31,499 participating students; Indiana has one voucher program 
with 34,299 participating students; Ohio has five voucher programs with a total of 46,780 participating students; 
and Wisconsin has four voucher programs with a total of 33,775 participating students. U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-94, PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE: FEDERAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENSURE 
PARENTS ARE NOTIFIED ABOUT CHANGES IN RIGHTS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 39–42 (2017). 
 290 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (holding that the absence of a contractual right to 
reemployment did not defeat a professor’s claim that a public university’s decision not to renew his contract was 
based on the professor’s public criticism of the university’s policies, and if true could violate the First 
Amendment). 
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federal statute placed an unconstitutional condition on the First Amendment by 
requiring organizations that receive federal HIV- and AIDS-related funding to 
adopt a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.291 In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court closely scrutinized the purpose of the condition and 
concluded that it did more than simply define the limits of government spending, 
but rather sought to leverage funding to regulate speech.292 The condition 
“demand[ed] that funding recipients adopt—as their own—the Government’s 
view on an issue of public concern.”293  
As applied to vouchers, conditions require students with disabilities to forfeit 
educational rights under federal and state laws which impact their state 
constitutional right to an education. Arguably, the animating purpose is to 
discourage, and in fact limit, these students’ educational rights, which puts it 
squarely within the definition of coercion. States will argue that the purpose of 
the condition is merely to facilitate the use of vouchers for students with 
disabilities to enter into better educational environments, namely private 
schools. However, if courts pull back the curtain on voucher legislation, they 
will likely find states’ reasoning hollow.  
Voucher conditions limit rights in both direct and indirect ways, but with the 
same result—unjustified encroachment of educational rights. First, several states 
directly require students with disabilities to waive their right to special education 
and related supports when they accept vouchers.294 Such demands often put 
parents in a position of choosing between a failing public school and the chance 
of a better private school, but with no guarantee that the new setting will 
ultimately prove any better. In such circumstances, the acceptance of a voucher 
and its conditions does not represent a “true choice.” Rather, it often represents 
the only prudent choice to escape a failing public school system. Second, states 
indirectly limit rights by shrouding voucher conditions in secrecy, making it 
unlikely that parents are fully aware of the effect of such conditions on their 
children’s statutory rights.295 In short, coercion exists because parents are not 
made aware of the rights they are giving up, and even when they are aware, 
many feel they have no reasonable choice but to give up those rights. 
 
 291 Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 208, 217 (2013). 
 292 Id. at 217. 
 293 Id. at 226. The Court has found coercion to exist in federal funding schemes when such programs are 
“aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.” Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958). 
 294 See supra Section II.A. 
 295 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-94, PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE: FEDERAL ACTIONS 
NEEDED TO ENSURE PARENTS ARE NOTIFIED ABOUT CHANGES IN RIGHTS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 25 
(2017). 
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The majority of states fail to provide sufficient notice to fully explain 
vouchers’ effects on educational rights.296 A 2017 GAO report found 83% of 
students enrolled in a private school program designed for students with 
disabilities “were in a program that provided either no information about 
changes in IDEA rights or provided information that . . . contained inaccuracies 
about these changes.”297 Parents may accept a voucher and enroll their child in 
a private school without realizing that they have much more limited, if any, 
control over the provision of special education services offered to their child. 
Voucher advocates would likely argue that no coercion exists because 
parents are not forced to accept vouchers. They can freely choose to engage with 
vouchers or reject them. But parents who are unhappy with their public school 
system are faced with the choice to either keep their child in the failing system, 
fight against that system by invoking due process rights under federal statutes, 
or accept a voucher and leave. Even where the public school is demonstrably 
failing their child and flouting federal statutory law, parents bear the burden of 
initiating costly and likely lengthy litigation to right those wrongs.298 When 
faced with this costly and tenuous victory, vouchers can present an enticing path 
out of the morass. All parents need do is essentially indemnify the state of the 
responsibility to educate their child. Thus, states offer parents a way to leave a 
public school system that is currently failing their child, for the promise of a 
school that may prove better. But, if the only way to ensure your child will enter 
that school is to sign away protections, that bargain is the definition of coercion. 
In all cases where parents of children with disabilities accept vouchers, they 
give up significant rights to special education tailored to their child’s unique 
needs. Acceptance of vouchers does not simply burden the free exercise of a 
right, it prohibits it altogether. Further, in states where vouchers are expanding 
and becoming the predominate education policy, the decision to decline a 
voucher (and keep the IDEA protections intact) is also fraught with concerns. 
Parents may be unhappy with the current public education option for their child, 
but the choice to leave comes with an enormous risk. Like the hypothetical 
scenario envisioned by Professor Berman, in a very real sense many parents 
 
 296 Id. at 1. 
 297 Id. at Highlights. 
 298 Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53, 55, 62 (2005). See generally Eloise Pasachoff, 
Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413 (2011) 
(arguing that more attention should be placed on public enforcement, rather than private enforcement of 
education statutes). 
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would be better off if the voucher programs did not exist and instead states 
increased commitments to improve public schools for all children.299 
B. The Equal Protection Clause 
A second challenge to the constitutionality of vouchers may be found in the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that sets forth: no State 
shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”300 While states are free to enact laws that treat groups of people 
differently, when they do so, they must identify a sufficiently important 
objective to justify the discrimination.301 Laws singling people with disabilities 
out for different treatment must pass rational basis review—that is, they must be 
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.302 Rational basis is the 
most minimal level of review and only rarely have laws been declared 
unconstitutional for failing to meet it.303 Challengers bear the burden of 
demonstrating the law does not meet any legitimate government purpose and 
courts defer to government action with a strong “presumption of rationality that 
can only be overcome by a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality.”304 
In a few groundbreaking cases, however, the Supreme Court has struck down 
laws for failure to survive rational basis review. In those cases, the Court has 
emphasized that while the government may pursue a limitless number of 
legitimate goals under rational basis review, there is one purpose that is 
presumptively invalid: targeting a particular group for disfavored treatment. In 
these cases, the Court has been less deferential in its application of rational basis 
review and unwilling to accept what might otherwise be legitimate goals. While 
voucher laws appear to provide a benefit (not a cost) to students, it is at least 
arguable that when applied to students with disabilities, the more invidious 
purpose of such laws is to remove a costly, litigious, and thus disfavored group 
of students from the public school system and alleviate the state’s burden of 
educating them. This is precisely the type of illegitimate targeting that the Court 
has found unconstitutional in other cases. 
 
 299 Berman, supra note 284, at 18–19. 
 300 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 301 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The general rule is 
that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest.”).  
 302 Id. at 446 (holding that the intellectually disabled are not a “suspect class” triggering a higher level of 
scrutiny). 
 303 See Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of Cleburne Living 
Center, Inc., 88 KY. L.J. 591, 611–12 (1999–2000). 
 304 Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331–32 (1981). 
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1. When Laws Fail Rational Basis Review 
The rational basis review is a notoriously low threshold for legislatures to 
cross. The Supreme Court has held that where rational basis review is applicable 
the government “need not ‘actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale 
supporting its classification.’”305 Rather, “a classification neither involving 
fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong 
presumption of validity.”306 Despite this low threshold, the Supreme Court has 
struck down a handful of laws under rational basis review for want of “legitimate 
public purpose.”307 
When reviewing those holdings carefully, a common theme emerges. In each 
case, the government purpose has been to single out the classified group for 
disfavored treatment. In other words, treating some identifiable group differently 
was not a byproduct of a government effort to reform welfare expenditures; 
rather, the government’s purpose was actually to disfavor a particular group and 
it did so through the restrictions on such programs.308 And in each case, the Court 
withheld the deference it typically accords the government and found the laws 
failed to survive rational basis review. The Court struck down these laws despite 
the fact that the government may have also had some other additional valid 
justifications, such as fiscal savings.309 Rather, in these instances, “the Court has 
found that the only plausible way to characterize the challenged statute was as 
an effort to disadvantage a group because of prejudice toward its members.”310 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. marks the first time the 
Supreme Court engaged in an equal protection analysis based on a class of 
intellectually disabled individuals.311 There, the Court struck down a zoning 
ordinance which excluded a group home meant for intellectually disabled 
individuals.312 The Court held that the intellectually disabled were not a suspect 
class that required a higher level of judicial scrutiny.313 Yet, the Court still found 
that no rational basis existed for believing the group home would pose any 
special threat to the city’s legitimate interests.314 Even though the City was 
 
 305 Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (citing Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992)). 
 306 Id. at 319. 
 307 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985). 
 308 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537–38 (1973). 
 309 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 (1982). 
 310 Saphire, supra note 303, at 608. 
 311 Id. at 610. 
 312 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450. 
 313 Id. at 442–43. 
 314 Id. at 448. The Court “did not question the legitimacy of [the] interests” offered by the city, but rather 
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pursuing the generally legitimate interest of safety, the Court found the 
ordinance was also motivated by “irrational prejudice” against the intellectually 
disabled.315 This particular prejudice and targeting of the group for disfavored 
treatment rendered the ordinance unconstitutional.316 In short, classifications 
imposed on a disfavored group due to prejudice do not serve a legitimate 
government interest and will fail to pass rational basis review.317 
In U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, the Supreme Court again 
struck down legislation for want of a legitimate government purpose.318 
Petitioners brought a challenge against enforcement of an amendment to the 
Food Stamp Act that made ineligible any household containing an individual 
unrelated to any other member of the household.319 The Court held the 
amendment was not rationally related to the stated purposes of the Act or to any 
legitimate governmental interest in minimizing fraud.320 In Moreno, the Court 
made plain that laws targeting disfavored groups violate equal protection, stating 
“[f]or if the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means 
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm 
a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental 
interest.”321 
Most recently, in Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court struck down a state 
law that made it illegal for municipalities to pass laws protecting people from 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.322 The Court applied rational basis 
review, acknowledging that it was “the most deferential of standards” but even 
 
examined whether the banning “of the group home was . . . a rational way to further any of [those interests].” 
Saphire, supra note 303. Unlike earlier rational basis review cases which were wholly deferential to legislatures, 
in Cleburne, the Court examined whether the classification furthered the government’s proffered interest in some 
rational way. Id. The Court’s unwillingness to defer to the government’s proffered interests led some 
commentators to believe that the case stood for a new proposition, referred to as “rational basis with bite.” Gayle 
Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 793 (1987). 
However, when the Court failed to extend this analysis to cases beyond Cleburne it became clear that the Court 
did not create a new standard for laws affecting the intellectually disabled. United States v. Harris, 197 F.3d 870, 
876 (7th Cir. 1999) (“With due deference to the congressional approach to legislation affecting the disabled, this 
Court chooses to follow the lead of our fellow circuit courts and the direction indicated by the Supreme Court 
to conclude that the disabled are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class. Therefore, we apply rationality review to 
claims of discrimination made by persons in this class.”). 
 315 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450. 
 316 Id.  
 317 Id. at 449–50. 
 318 413 U.S. 528, 537–38 (1973). 
 319 Id. at 530. 
 320 Id. at 534. 
 321 Id. 
 322 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996). 
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so, insisted on “knowing the relation between the classification adopted and the 
object to be attained.”323 Thus, rather than deferring to the legislature’s proffered 
justifications for the law, the Court sought to examine those justifications—a 
step beyond what is typically required in rational basis review.324 Because the 
Court found no legitimate purpose in singling out a certain class of persons for 
“disfavored legal status,” it struck down the law as violating the Equal Protection 
Clause.325 The Court went on to state, “[a] law declaring that in general it shall 
be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from 
the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal 
sense.”326 
Finally, it is worth noting one additional case which sits at the intersection 
of education and rational basis review—Plyler v. Doe.327 In Plyler, the Supreme 
Court held that a Texas law excluding a class of undocumented Mexican 
children from access to public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause.328 
Because the undocumented immigrant children were not a suspect class and 
education is not considered a “fundamental right,” the Court applied rational 
basis review to analyze the law.329 While the Court did not hold that laws 
impacting education should be treated differently under an equal protection 
analysis, it nonetheless could not disregard the fact that the law sought the 
wholesale exclusion of a class of children from public schools. In discussing the 
law’s impact on education, the Court said: 
By denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability 
to live within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any 
realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way 
to the progress of our Nation. In determining the rationality of [the 
Texas statute], we may appropriately take into account its costs to the 
Nation and to the innocent children who are its victims. In light of 
these countervailing costs, the discrimination contained in [the Texas 
statute] can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some 
substantial goal of the State.330 
Here, as with the previous cases, the Court was not willing to defer to 
government interests when the goal of the legislation was to target a group for 
 
 323 Id. at 632. 
 324 Saphire, supra note 303, at 611 n.90. 
 325 Evans, 517 U.S. at 635–36. 
 326 Id. at 633. 
 327 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). 
 328 Id. 
 329 Id. at 223–24. 
 330 Id. 
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disfavored treatment. Texas proffered cost savings as a legitimate government 
interest, claiming the law would “preserv[e] the state’s limited resources for the 
education of its lawful residents”331 and argued that “undocumented children are 
appropriately singled out for exclusion because of the special burdens they 
impose on the State’s ability to provide high-quality public education.”332 But 
the Court rejected such interests, holding instead that the classification violated 
the Equal Protection Clause because it failed to demonstrate how excluding a 
class of children from public school was “reasonably adapted” to the purpose of 
providing a high quality education for all children in public school.333 In 
justifying its holding, the Court cited to a previous case for the proposition that 
the state may “not . . . reduce expenditures for education by barring [some 
arbitrarily chosen class of] children from its schools.”334 
Plyler echoes the underlying theme of the previous cases: laws that seek to 
target specific groups for disfavored treatment are inherently suspect—even 
under rational basis review. Plyler may also instruct courts to review laws 
circumventing rights to education more closely. While the Court did not hold 
that education was per se different, a narrow reading of Plyler suggests that cost 
may not always justify class-based denials of education. Arguably, what 
Cleburne, Moreno, Romer, and Plyler have in common is the plaintiffs’ ability 
to convince the Court that the legislation at issue unfairly targeted and 
disadvantaged a certain group based on “irrational prejudice” or merely a “desire 
to harm a politically unpopular group.”335 Once such a showing was made, the 
Court was less willing to give the state the deference it would otherwise accord 
under a rational basis analysis. Rather, when plaintiffs were able to demonstrate 
 
 331 Id. at 227. 
 332 Id. at 229.  
 333 Id. at 230. “The State may borrow the federal classification. But to justify its use as a criterion for its 
own discriminatory policy, the State must demonstrate that the classification is reasonably adapted to ‘the 
purposes for which the state desires to use it.’” Id. at 226 (citing Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 664–65 
(1948) (Murphy, J., concurring)). 
 334 Id. at 229 (alteration in original) (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969)). In Thompson, 
the Supreme Court held that a District of Columbia statute that denied welfare assistance to residents who had 
not resided within their jurisdiction for at least one year preceding their application for welfare benefits was a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 394 U.S. at 621–22. Because the constitutional right in question 
implicated the right to travel across state lines, a constitutional right, the Court applied strict scrutiny and thus 
required the Government to show a compelling interest in order to uphold the law. Id. at 634. The Court held 
that while the Government had a valid interest in limiting expenditures in public programs, such as public 
education, it may not accomplish this purpose by “invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens.” Id. at 
633. The Court went on to say that a state “could not, for example, reduce expenditures for education by barring 
indigent children from its schools.” Id. 
 335 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
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that proposed laws targeted a group for “disfavored legal status,” deference to 
previously legitimate state justifications, such as cost, fell flat.336 
Voucher legislation, under certain circumstances, would fail to pass rational 
basis review for this very same reason. While voucher laws are seemingly 
intended to benefit students with disabilities by providing them a choice to leave 
the public school system, this choice comes at a significant cost—the waiver of 
federal and state laws guaranteeing equal access to education. Rather than 
receiving a benefit, students with disabilities suffer the loss of important rights. 
In fact, the benefit of voucher laws is recouped by the state, who is released from 
federal and state obligations to provide this cohort with equal educational 
opportunities and is shielded from liability should vouchers fail to produce better 
educational outcomes. Stripping students with disabilities of educational rights 
serves no legitimate state purpose, but only insulates states from liability should 
they run afoul of federal and state laws. 
Most important, however, is that states may have another illicit motive—
limiting their duties to a costly and litigious cohort of students. As the following 
section will demonstrate, voucher legislation targeting students with disabilities 
may be animated by the states’ desires to limit their responsibility to this group, 
and when viewed in this context, it is at least arguable that voucher laws target 
students with disabilities for disfavored treatment. 
2. Why Vouchers Fail Rational Basis Review  
To overcome rational basis review, students with disabilities would need to 
demonstrate that voucher legislation unfairly targets them for disfavored 
treatment. They could make such a showing by demonstrating two points. First, 
states’ proffered justifications for vouchers bear no relationship to the 
infringement of students with disabilities’ rights under federal and state laws. 
Second, states’ insistence on restricting the rights of students with disabilities is 
motivated by two illegitimate goals: avoiding burdensome obligations of federal 
laws, and shifting the responsibility of educating a costly and litigious group. 
Voucher legislation singles out students with disabilities for disfavored 
treatment by requiring that they relinquish important rights to education under 
both state and federal laws.337 And it does so to advance state interests that are 
divorced from the legislation’s stated purpose. States claim the animating 
principles behind vouchers are improved educational outcomes, fiscal savings, 
 
 336 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996). 
 337 ARK. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 121. 
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and facilitating parents’ ability to choose a school most appropriate for their 
children.338 All of these goals can be readily achieved without limiting students’ 
rights to equal educational opportunities. Yet, states ask students to waive their 
educational rights, inducing dire consequences. 
Students with disabilities must trust that the private school will have the tools 
necessary to educate them even when their needs require deviations from the 
norm. Should private schools fail in this regard, students with disabilities give 
up the right to hold schools accountable. Essentially, voucher legislation 
encumbers the rights of students with disabilities, and similar to the ordinance 
in Romer v. Evans, makes it “more difficult for [them] than for all others to seek 
aid from the government.”339 Students without disabilities can be relatively sure 
that they will be able to access a curriculum as delivered by the private school. 
Because they do not require additional supports and services, they lose nothing 
by forfeiting access to them. But a student who needs differentiated instruction, 
and loses access to it, loses everything. Consequently, vouchers single out 
students with disabilities for special and disfavored treatment. 
Moreover, none of the states’ proffered reasons for enacting voucher 
legislation (educational outcomes, free choice, fiscal savings) are related to the 
restriction on rights for students with disabilities. States claim that vouchers 
offer students with disabilities a way out of a public school system that is failing 
to meet their needs.340 They claim that vouchers offer a chance at better 
educational outcomes. The most recent data analyzing student performance 
under voucher programs is at best neutral, and at worst evidences poorer 
performance in private school settings.341 But even if the data painted a rosier 
picture (finding students with disabilities had improved educational outcomes in 
private schools), such a conclusion may still not warrant the restriction of federal 
statutory rights enacted to prevent disability discrimination. The restriction of 
access to laws designed to protect against disability discrimination and provide 
equal educational opportunity is not necessary to the development of school 
choice programs. If states are truly concerned about improved educational 
outcomes for students with disabilities, then ensuring access to the federal 
statutes that would guarantee them the tools they require to facilitate learning 
would support that goal. Instead, the government claims that students with 
 
 338 See supra Section III.A.3.a. 
 339 517 U.S. at 633. 
 340 COPAA REPORT, supra note 4, at 19; EDCHOICE, THE ABCS OF SCHOOL CHOICE: THE 
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO EVERY PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAM IN AMERICA 3 (2018), https://www. 
edchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ABCs-of-School-Choice-2018-Edition-1.pdf. 
 341 See supra note 281 and accompanying text. 
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disabilities should forgo federal protections because doing so would facilitate 
improved educational outcomes. Just as in Cleburne, the governments’ proffered 
interests are “so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.”342 
Likewise, states claim that vouchers provide parents of students with 
disabilities a way to choose a school that best fits the needs of their children. But 
facilitating parents’ freedom to choose the right school for their children would 
not be stymied by also ensuring their children’s rights were intact when enrolling 
in those schools. 
Finally, states claim that because vouchers cost less than educating students 
with disabilities in public schools, their state budgets reap the savings from 
enacting such programs. States would continue to recover those savings without 
restricting rights. Further, while fiscal savings are generally viewed by courts as 
a legitimate government interest, in those cases where plaintiffs have 
demonstrated that legislation targeted their group for disfavored treatment, cost 
was not found to be a sufficient goal to warrant such treatment.343 Rather, at least 
in the case where access to education was completely denied, the Court held that 
the state may “not . . . reduce expenditures for education by barring [some 
arbitrarily chosen class of] children from its schools.”344 While voucher 
legislation does not bar educational access entirely, it effectively makes it much 
less certain that students with disabilities will have the supports and services 
necessary to ensure they are able to access the curriculum as effectively as their 
nondisabled peers. None of the states’ proffered reasons for vouchers would be 
impugned by ensuring students with disabilities’ access to federal and state 
rights meant to guarantee equal educational opportunity. In essence, the ends do 
not justify the means. 
Some could argue that private schools may be less willing to accept vouchers 
if it means they will be responsible for providing supports and services necessary 
to educate students with disabilities. But this criticism actually exposes an 
ulterior motive for such legislation—states’ desire to divest themselves of the 
obligation to a costly cohort of students. While state legislators publicly adopt 
the mantle of free choice as the driving force behind voucher legislation, the real 
motivator is the relinquishment of the responsibility to educate a costly and 
litigious group of students. Thus, vouchers may appear to provide a benefit to 
students with disabilities in the form of money to attend private schools, but 
peeling back the curtain on such legislation reveals an entirely different set of 
 
 342 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985). 
 343 See supra Section III.B.1. 
 344 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969); see also supra note 334 and accompanying text. 
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animating principles, which shift the story told by voucher legislation from one 
of free choice to one of dereliction of duties. 
When students with disabilities are in public schools they have access to a 
robust set of rights under the IDEA, the ADA, and Section 504.345 The statutes 
impose affirmative obligations on schools to convey both substantive and 
procedural rights.346 Meeting these obligations can be costly for states. Further, 
when schools fail, students can invoke the federal laws to demand that schools 
meet their obligations.347 Such actions can be costly for school districts to defend 
against.348 Limiting students’ access to these laws alleviates this cost. 
Because of the monumental deference paid to lawmakers under rational 
basis review, some may believe that striking down voucher legislation under the 
Equal Protection Clause is, to put it bluntly, a long shot.349 But, if courts are 
willing to recognize that the conversation around vouchers has been 
misconstrued, rational basis may still have bite. When analyzing cases that have 
failed to survive rational basis review, a new framework emerges. This 
framework suggests that when groups are targeted for disfavored treatment, 
courts should more carefully scrutinize the state’s proffered interests to 
determine whether such interests are legitimate. Vouchers single out students 
with disabilities for disfavored status, encumbering their educational rights, but 
not the rights of their peers. Thus, vouchers are not simply about helping 
students with disabilities get out of struggling public schools. They are about 
shifting the burden of educating this costly group of students to the private 
sector. Because the justification for such a significant encumbrance on 
educational rights is so attenuated to the purpose of the legislation, vouchers 
may be the rare type of classification that would, in fact, fail rational basis 
review. 
 
 345 See supra Section I.B. 
 346 See supra Section I.B. 
 347 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2012). Procedural safeguards include: an opportunity for parents to “examine all 
records” concerning their child, to participate in meetings relating to “identification, evaluation, and educational 
placement of the child,” to receive an independent educational evaluation of their child, to receive written prior 
notice regarding proposals “to initiate or change,” or refusals “to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, 
or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a [FAPE]” to the child. Id. § 1415(b)(1), (3). 
Additionally, parents have an ability to pursue mediation, and to present a complaint “with respect to any matter 
relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a [FAPE] to 
such child.” Id. § 1415(b)(5)–(6). 
 348 See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
 349 As one scholar candidly summarized, “the conception of rational basis review as a ‘bulwark’ against 
significant, and even unreasonable, discrimination seems more to reflect wishful thinking than a candid 
assessment of Supreme Court doctrine.” Saphire, supra note 303, at 635. 
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IV. SOLUTIONS 
In many instances vouchers represent the privatization or elimination of 
states’ constitutional obligations to provide for a system of public education. 
State legislatures can lawfully decide to spend taxpayer money on such a system, 
but if the goal is to provide better educational opportunities in the private sector 
for all students, then states should require voucher-recipient private schools to 
adhere to many of the requirements of the IDEA as well as the ADA and Section 
504. Voucher legislation can more effectively address the inequities currently 
borne by students with disabilities, but both federal and state governments must 
first recognize the problems created by the current system and have the will to 
fix it. 
A. Congressional Solutions 
The most impactful solution rests with the federal government. For the many 
reasons discussed throughout this Article, voucher legislation unjustly burdens 
the rights of students with disabilities. Congress could right this wrong with a 
straightforward amendment to the IDEA. Congress should clarify that publicly 
funded education programs (including vouchers) will be treated as public 
placements for purposes of the IDEA.350 Such treatment would ensure that 
certain key responsibilities for the provision of special education services remain 
with the state.351 
When the IDEA was enacted, Congress likely did not anticipate the 
expansion of hybrid public–private placements, where public funds facilitate 
placement at private schools. However, because the IDEA assigns states the task 
of identifying all students with disabilities and providing FAPE, such 
responsibility should remain with the state when public funds are used to 
facilitate an educational placement. For example, under the IDEA, when a child 
changes public school programs, through relocation or an intra-district magnet 
school option, the state is still responsible for the provision of FAPE to the child, 
 
 350 In 1990, the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights issued a memorandum which 
stated the agency’s interpretation that students who are placed in private schools through a voucher program are 
considered to be parentally placed in private schools and, are thus, not fully covered by the IDEA’s protections. 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, OCR STAFF MEMORANDUM 1 (1990); see also Letter from 
Susan Bowers, Acting Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, and Patricia J. Guard, Acting Dir., Office of 
Special Educ. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to John W. Bowen, Att’y for Pinellas Cty. Sch. Bd. (Mar. 30, 
2001), http://www.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2001-1/bowen3302001fape.doc (confirming that 
federal civil rights laws “do not directly apply to the private schools participating” in Florida’s voucher program). 
 351 34 C.F.R. § 300.132 (2018). 
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regardless of which publicly funded school she chooses.352 So too, should the 
state’s obligation continue when vouchers are used to place students in private 
schools. 
Because it would be impractical to expect that private schools would be 
equipped to provide all the educational and supportive services necessary for all 
types of disabilities, the onus for such provision should remain with the state. In 
other words, the IDEA should be amended to clarify that when students use 
public funds to attend private schools, the state cannot divest itself of the 
responsibility to confer FAPE. Rather, the state would still be obligated to 
monitor compliance of private schools “through procedures such as written 
reports, on-site visits, and parent questionnaires.”353 Such an amendment would 
facilitate school choice, by allowing parents to select private schools if so 
desired, but at the same time would keep the core components of the IDEA intact 
such that students who accepted public funding to attend private schools could 
be assured of meaningful access to education. 
B. State Legislative Solutions 
States that wish to enact voucher legislation should ensure that such laws 
protect the rights of students with disabilities rather than obfuscate them. 
Legislators should require private schools that accept vouchers to fully abide by 
the IDEA, the ADA, and Section 504. Further, legislators should include 
accountability structures such as participation in statewide assessment and 
publicly available student performance data. State legislators should also 
demand that voucher recipient schools be able to meet high standards for teacher 
qualifications and require special education training or other certifications when 
schools hold themselves out as providing special education programs. 
Some states are moving in this direction, requiring private schools to meet 
accreditation requirements and mandating nationally standardized testing.354 But 
even the states that have implemented accountability measures either explicitly 
demand waivers of federal disability rights or remain silent on the voucher’s 
effect on these rights.355 Schools receiving public funds should not only be held 
accountable for quality of instruction and for student performance outcomes, but 
 
 352 34 C.F.R. § 300.323. 
 353 34 C.F.R. § 300.147(a). 
 354 ARK. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 121. Arkansas’s Succeed Scholarship Program for Students with 
Disabilities requires private schools to meet Arkansas State Board of Education accreditation requirements for 
providing appropriate services for students with disabilities. Id. 
 355 Kevin P. Brady, The Paradox of State-Funded Private Choice Vouchers, Accountability Measures, and 
Legal Protections for Students with Disabilities, 344 EDUC. L. REP. 635, 642 (2017). 
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should also be prohibited from violating these students’ rights. Thus, states 
should both include meaningful accountability measures in the voucher 
programs as well as ensure that private schools that participate are, as a whole, 
accessible to children with disabilities. 
C. Judicial Solutions 
Even if Congress and states fail to act, courts have the power and obligation 
to achieve several of the foregoing goals. Courts could declare voucher programs 
unconstitutional when evidence indicates that the state is using the program as a 
solution to poorly funded and underperforming public schools, and conditioning 
voucher access on waiver of federal and/or state educational rights. 
When the only way to escape a failing public school system is to accept a 
voucher that strips away constitutional and statutory rights, students are not 
actually exercising free choice. They are forced into making a choice between 
two evils. Such coercion should not stand under the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine, particularly where plaintiffs can demonstrate that the government 
interests of saving money and improved educational outcomes are not met 
through the enactment of vouchers. Further, if plaintiffs can reframe the debate 
to demonstrate that vouchers in fact harm students with disabilities, courts 
should also strike down such legislation under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Courts should ensure that voucher programs do not divest students with 
disabilities of their rights, but rather offer them a meaningful choice between 
public or private school. 
CONCLUSION 
Giving parents the freedom to choose a school best suited to their child’s 
needs is an easy concept to embrace. Parents, after all, are in the best position to 
make educational decisions on behalf of their children. But the lure of choice is 
lost when its effects on students with disabilities are exposed. For these students, 
choice comes at a serious cost. They must also “choose” to give up the critical 
state and federal rights that ensure their equal access to education. Without these 
rights, students with disabilities have no guarantee that a private school will be 
capable of meeting their unique educational needs. For those students who are 
in public schools that are already failing to meet their needs, accepting a voucher 
and relinquishing educational rights may feel like a coerced choice. 
Voucher legislation ultimately violates principles of constitutional law by 
unduly burdening students’ rights and unjustifiably targeting students with 
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disabilities for disfavored treatment. Moreover, vouchers impose significant 
costs on students with disabilities without adequate justification. If states are 
sincerely concerned with providing students with disabilities more or better 
educational options, they should enact voucher programs without conditions. 
This would guarantee that a student with disabilities could walk into a private 
school knowing that they would have the same opportunity at a meaningful 
education as any other student. If states refuse to take action, then courts should. 
If school choice legislation continues to expand, it must recognize the costs 
currently imposed on students with disabilities and provide these students with 
true, not coerced, choice. 
